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The Globalization of Baseball:
Major League Baseball and the Mistreatment of
Latin American Baseball Talent*
ARTURO J. MARCANO'"
DAVID P. FIDLER-
INTRODUCTION
The 1998 Major League Baseball (MLB) season was filled with many
memorable moments and achievements. While not as obvious as the historic
home run duel between Mark McGwire and Sammy Sosa, the 1998 MLB
season reflected the growing prominence of foreign baseball players in the
League. This prominence appears not only in the performances of foreign
superstars such as Sammy Sosa' and Bernie Williams2 but also in overall
number of foreign players now on MLB rosters. MLB reports that thirty-two
percent of MLB professional baseball players were born outside the United
States and that 147 MLB players represent twenty-three countries. The
international flavor to MLB is continuing in the 1999 season as the Baltimore
Orioles have played two games against a Cuban all-star team, and the
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1. Sosa won the 1998 MVP Award for the National League. See Murray Chass, Here's One for
Sammy: The National League MVP, IN1T'L HERALD TRIB., Nov. 20, 1998, at 23.
2. Williams won the American League batting title in 1998. See Buster Olney, Batting Title for
Williams, with Free AgencyAhead, N.Y. TIMEs, Sept. 28, 1998, at D7.
3. MLB Web Page (visited Oct. 2, 1998) <http'//www.majorleaguebasebalLcom/mlbi/gdl.sml>.
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Colorado Rockies and San Diego Padres opened their seasons with a game in
Monterrey, Mexico.
The global growth of MLB is also reflected in the growing global
community of MLB fans. As foreign players have successfully penetrated
MLB, baseball fans in many other countries follow the successes of their
"native sons" in the Big Show. Many of these countries sport a strong cultural
attachment to baseball, whether in the form of MLB or local leagues and
teams. MLB is, and has for several years, been moving to exploit the potential
of this growing global community of baseball fans. As MLB notes,
"America's pastime is growing-and most of that growth is happening outside
the United States."4  Gene Budig, President of the American League, has
asserted boldly that "[o]ur National Pastime is now the world's."5
The success of foreign players in MLB and MLB's efforts to tap into a
global community of baseball fans represent elements in the phenomenon of
the globalization of baseball. On the surface, the globalization of baseball
appears benign as it brings Americans and foreigners together in mutual
enjoyment of sport. The globalization of baseball has, however, a dark side
that has received surprisingly little attention from those who follow the game.
MLB teams systematically treat potential baseball talent in Latin America"
less favorably than they do American baseball prospects. This Article focuses
on this unpleasant reality of the globalization of baseball in order to raise
awareness about an aspect of MLB that should concern fans of the sport.
In Part I, we demonstrate that baseball is much more than a pastime; it is
big business, both domestically and now globally. The business of MLB now
involves accessing global markets for: (1) baseball consumers in many
countries besides the United States, and (2) baseball talent or labor. In going
global to access these markets, MLB behaves like other big businesses facing
globalization in their respective areas. Multinational companies (MNCs) have
for many decades been building global markets for their products and utilizing
a global labor pool to manufacture those products. MLB's international
activities follow the same path already blazed by MNCs.
In Part II, we define more precisely what the globalization of baseball
means. This phenomenon contains two basic dynamics: the denationalization
4. Id.
5. Gene Budig. Baseball Has a Worldly Look, USA TODAY, June 26, 1998, at 6C.
6. For purposes of this Article, "Latin America" includes countries in the Caribbean, Central
America, and South America.
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of(l) the market for baseball consumers, and (2) the market for baseball labor.
For most of its history, MLB tapped into an overwhelmingly national
market-the United States-for fans and players. Today, the markets for fans
and players span many countries. Again, the denationalization of markets for
businesses is not new as MNCs have already been down this road. In the
globalization of baseball, one can find strong echoes of the globalization of
markets generally.
In Part 1I, we focus on how the globalization of baseball produces in
MLB the less favorable treatment of baseball prospects in Latin American
countries. The heart of this argument is that MLB and MLB teams treat
Latino baseball talent in ways that would not be tolerated in the United States.
We examine three specific areas where this less favorable treatment is
manifest: in the process of scouting Latino baseball prospects; in the baseball
academies in Latin American countries; and in how MLB actively discourages
Latino baseball prospects from using agents. Again, the historical behavior
of MNCs provides a good analogy as MNCs routinely treat foreign workers
less favorably in terms of pay and working conditions than they do workers
in the United States. Such MNC behavior has been subjected to harsh
criticism by non-governmental organizations (NGOs) working to promote
international human rights and labor standards. We believe MLB deserves the
same type of scrutiny in connection with it activities with Latino baseball
prospects.
In Part IV, we argue that the behavior of MLB teams with respect to
Latino baseball prospects violates international human rights and labor
standards. First, MLB teams behave in ways that jeopardize the human rights
of children enshrined in the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the
Child. Second, MLB teams behave in ways that violate international labor
standards crafted by the International Labor Organization in connection with
their treatment of Latino children. When MLB teams are engaged in
violations of established international human rights and labor norms, we
believe that critical attention should be brought to bear on MLB to correct the
unseemly side of the globalization of baseball.
In Part V, we discuss possible ways to remedy the less favorable treatment
received by Latino baseball prospects. The remedies include legal responses,
institutional reform with MLB, and labor pressure on MLB from Latino
baseball players. The most realistic short-term remedy, we believe, is for
Latino and other foreign baseball players to form a labor association to put
1999]
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pressure on MLB teams to end their less favorable treatment of foreign
baseball prospects.
We conclude by arguing that the globalization of baseball has made
baseball a global game and has given MLB not only global opportunities to
make money but also global responsibilities that it must face if the future of
baseball as a pastime and as a business is to be healthy and honorable.
I. THE GLOBAL BusINEss OF BASEBALL
The moniker "America's pastime" obscures the degree to which baseball
has from its earliest days been a business designed to make money. The
National League had its origins in the desire of influential baseball men to
organize professional baseball around sound business principles. Influential
figures, such as William Hulbert, Harry Wright, and Albert Spalding,
succeeded in turning baseball from a pastime into big business, meaning that
"[tihe managing end of the game was to be separate and distinct from the
playing end, thus allowing the players to concentrate on performance and
leave business affairs and promotion to the owners." Spalding argued that
taking ballplayers out of the management of the game merely reflected:
[T]he irrepressible conflict between Labor and Capital
asserting itself under a new guise .... Like every other form
of business enterprise, Base Ball [sic] depends for results on
two interdependent divisions, the one to have absolute control
and direction of the system, and the other to engage-always
under the executive branch-the actual work of production.8
These men were clearly thinking about baseball as a business rather just a
pastime.
The American League also came to life through savvy business strategies
crafted by Byron Bancroft (Ban) Johnson. Johnson built a struggling minor
league circuit called the Western League into the American League-a force
that eventually challenged the professional baseball monopoly of the National
7. HARoLD SEYMOUR, BASEBALL: THE EARLY YEARS 80 (1960).
8. Quoted in id.
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League.9 Johnson hired talent away from the National League by offering
higher salaries and advertised the American League's family-friendly
atmosphere in the ballpark." The American League brought competition to
professional baseball for both baseball consumers-the fans-and baseball
talent. The business success of Johnson's American League forced the once
dominant National League to negotiate an agreement with the challenger in
1902 that would prove to be the foundation for MLB.YI
The growth of the business of baseball in the United States would
probably have staggered even the business-savvy founders of MLB.'
Baseball revenues and expenses have reached huge amounts. The MLB
Commissioner's Office estimated that per team revenue in 1998 ranged from
the highest figure of $170 million (believed to be the New York Yankees) to
the lowest amount of $35 million (believed to be the Montreal Expos). 3 MLB
teams derive their revenue from three basic sources: gate and stadium
receipts, sale of television and radio broadcasting rights, and sales of licensed
products.' 4 While gate and stadium receipts used to account for the majority
of a MLB team's revenue, today television broadcast revenues constitute the
biggest revenue item." Licensing revenues have also grown enormously for
MLB, with total sales of licensed products growing from $200 million in 1987
to $1.5 billion in 1990.16 Licensing revenues are distributed equally among
MLB teams, meaning that in 1990 each team received an estimated $2.7
million from sales of licensed products.' 7
Costs have also grown enormously, largely because of escalating players'
salaries. Zimbalist estimated that the cost of players' salaries as a percentage
9. Id. at 307-08.
10. See id. at 309, 314 (noting how "the fans came out because they liked the American's absence of
rowdyism" and the American League's success in "raiding National League stars.").
11. See id. at 322-24 (discussing details of the agreement that brought the National and American
Leagues together).
12. For detailed overviews of the business of baseball, see ANDREW ZIMBALIST, BASEBALL AND
BILLIONS: A PROBING LOOK INSIDE THE BIG BUSINESS OF OUR NATIONAL PASTIME (1992); David
Pietrusza, The Business of Baseball, in TOTAL BASEBALL: THE OFFICIAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF MAJOR
LEAGUE BASEBALL 588 (J. Thorn and P. Palmer eds., 4th ed., 1995) [hereinafter TOTAL BASEBALL].
13. See CBS SportsLine Web Page (visited Jan. 11, 1999) <tlp'J/cbs.sportsline.com/...overs/baseball/
dec98/bigsalaryl2l 898.htm>.
14. ZIMBAUST, supra note 12, at 48.
15. Id.
16. Id. at 57.
17. Id. at 58.
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of total team revenue was 17.6% in 1974 but 42.9% in 1991. 8 Tables l and
2 list the 1998 team payrolls for both the American and National Leagues. In
aggregate, the payroll expenses of both Leagues in 1998 exceeded half a
billion dollars.
Table 1: American League Payrolls, 199919
Team
Anaheim Angels
Baltimore Orioles
Boston Red Sox
Chicago White Sox
Cleveland Indians
Detroit Tigers
Kansas City Royals
Minnesota Twins
New York Yankees
Oakland Athletics
Seattle Mariners
Tampa Bay Devil Rays
Texas Rangers
Toronto Blue Jays
Grand Total
Salary
$ 51,830,166
78,902,282
59,553,500
24,560,000
68,061,627
34,104,666
23,706,000
19,242,500
85,034,692
23,234,333
49,963,503
33,952,500
74,834,931
44,509,333
671,490,033
18. Id. at 59.
19. Hal Bradley, 1999 Major League Baseball Salaries, USATODAY, Apr. 6, 1999, at 14c.
[Vol. 6:511
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Table 2: National League Payrolls, 199920
Team
Arizona Diamondbacks
Atlanta Braves
Chicago Cubs
Cincinnati Reds
Colorado Rockies
Florida Marlins
Houston Astros
Los Angeles Dodgers
Milwaukee Brewers
Montreal Expos
New York Mets
Philadelphia Phillies
Pittsburgh Pirates
St. Louis Cardinals
San Diego Padres
San Francisco Giants
Grand Total
Salary
$ 66,078,999
73,585,000
60,191,500
33,162,761
55,864,837
18,876,000
51,629,000
79,265,953
41,395,762
16,175,500
62,450,427
30,297,500
22,197,666
45,698,333
47,828,346
44,943,557
749,641,141
20. Id.
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In addition, salaries for MLB stars continue to escalate. During the off-
season after the 1998 season, a number of MLB free agents signed with new
or current teams for astonishing sums of money." The ever-escalating salary
costs of MLB players has stirred controversy and worry within MLB. In
January 1999, the MLB Commissioner announced the formation of a Blue
Ribbon Task Force on Baseball Economics to study the economic and
financial condition of MLB.22 The biggest problem facing the Blue Ribbon
Task Force, according to the MLB Commissioner, is payroll disparity between
high-revenue teams and low-revenue teams.23 As noted below, these ever-
increasing financial pressures on MLB intensify MLB teams' search for high-
quality talent on the cheap in Latin America.
Although these significant economic and financial statistics demonstrate
that baseball in the United States is big business, they do not capture the
global dimensions of MLB. As quoted earlier, MLB sees its "emerging
markets" to be outside the United States. MLB is aggressively marketing its
products overseas through various strategies and programs. The most
lucrative for MLB are the sales of television broadcasting rights for foreign
markets and sales of MLB-licensed products to overseas markets. Figures for
total MLB revenues generated by overseas sales of licensed merchandise and
television broadcasting rights are difficult to find. Zimbalist reported that
total 1990 MLB licensing revenues were $1.5 billion,24 but how much of that
$1.5 billion was generated by sales outside the United States is not clear.
MLB sales of television broadcasting rights generated $1.7 billion for MLB
2 1. Some of the astounding salary deals included the following players and teams: the Los Angeles
Dodgers signed pitcher Kevin Brown to a $105 million, seven-year contract; the New York Mets signed
catcher Mike Piazza to a $91 million, seven-year contract; the New York Yankees signed right fielder
Bernie Williams to a $87.5 million, seven-year contract; the Anaheim Angels signed first baseman Mo
Vaughan to a $80 million, six-year contract; the Baltimore Orioles signed left fielder Albert Belle to a $65
million, five-year contract; and the Arizona Diamondbacks signed pitcher Randy Johnson to a $52.4
million, four-year contract. See CNN/SI Web Page (visited Jan. 10, 1999) <lttp://www.cnnsi.com/baseball
/mlb/news/1998/12/24/freeagent signings/>; Jason Diamos, Brown Becomes the Richest in Baseball, N.Y.
TIMEs, Dec. 13, 1998, § 8, at 1.
22. See Murray Chass, Selig Names Panel to Study Payrolls, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 14, 1999, at D9. The
Task Force members include thirteen officials from twelve MLB teams and George Mitchell, Paul Volker,
Richard Levin, and George Will. Id.
23. Id. See also George Will, Baseball in Trouble OverEconomics, BLOOMINGTON SUNDAY HERALD
TIMES, Feb. 28, 1999, at A13 (arguing that "[rievenue disparities now pose an unprecedented threat to
baseball's competitive balance.").
24. ZIMBAuST, supra note 12, at 57.
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in 1995 .25 The growing prominence of foreign players in MLB has produced
more demand for MLB broadcasts in other countries, particularly in Asia.26
In addition, MLB organizes programs involving U.S. amateur coaches
teaching baseball fundamentals overseas;27 Pitch, Hit, and Run competitions
for young children in foreign countries;' and "baseball festivals" that
introduce MLB to new foreign audiences.29 All these programs strategically
aim to build foreign markets for MLB's products-baseball games and
licensed merchandise.
The globalizing of the baseball business can also be found in MLB teams'
increasing efforts to find baseball players outside the United States. The
extension of the talent hunt to foreign fields is not a recent development, but
has gradually grown in scope and intensity as foreign baseball players have
proved successful in MLB. In the 1960's, MLB teams began to look more
systematically for baseball talent in Latin America.' In the 1970's, MLB
teams began building training facilities in Latin American countries to develop
further access to baseball talent.3' In addition, the participation of MLB
players in the Latin American winter leagues helped develop the interest of
MLB teams in Latino baseball talent.32 In 1986, DeVoss argued that "[t]o a
large extent, a team's ability to compete for a pennant today is determined by
its scouting organization in Latin America."33  Today, many MLB teams
engage in extensive efforts to find Latino baseball talent. Unfortunately, the
nature of these extensive efforts creates problems that we analyze later in this
Article.
25. CBS SportsLine Web Page (visited Feb. 17, 1999) <http/cbs.sportsline.comupage/cyberspylspy
S.htm>.
26. See Part 11.A. 1 for more on international broadcasts of MLB games.
27. MLB Web Page, supra note 3 (describing the Envoy Program).
28. Id. (describing Pitch, Hit, and Run competitions).
29. Id. (describing "baseball festivals").
30. Steve Wulf, El Futuro, ESPN: THE MAGAZINE, Apr. 1998, at 82, 82 (noting that "[in the '60s,
scouts were making forays" into Latin America). On Latin American baseball generally, see MICHAEL M.
OLEKsAx & MARY ADAMS OLEKSAK, BkISBOL: LATIN AMERICANS AND THE GRAND OLD GAME (1991);
PETE C. BjARKMAN, BASEBALL WITH ALATIN BEAT: A HISTORY OF THE LATIN AMERICAN GAME (1994);
Rob Ruck, Baseball in the Caribbean, in TOTAL BASEBALL, supra note 12, at 560; SAMUEL 0. REGALADO,
VIVA BASEBALL LATIN MAJOR LEAGUERS AND THEIR SPECIAL HUNGER (1998).
3 1. Regalado notes that by 1960 "Latins appeared on most big league rosters." REGALADO, supra note
30, at 116.
32. See Ruck, supra note 30, at 563 (discussing participation by MLB players and minor leaguers
in the Latin winter leagues).
33. David DeVoss, Edwin Tapia Joins the Dodgers in the Dominican Republic, LA. TIMES, Feb. 23,
1986, at 10.
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While Latin American countries have been the largest source of foreign
baseball talent for MLB,34 Asia is also a labor market for MLB teams.
Baseball is big business in Japan too,3" and recent MLB teams' acquisitions
of Japanese baseball stars highlight the global growth of the MLB market for
baseball talent? 6
MLB is also eyeing the synergies created by global growth of its business.
More foreign baseball players in MLB makes it easier for MLB to sell
television broadcasting rights and licensed merchandise in the native countries
of the MLB players. In addition, MLB sees in Latino communities in the
United States a growing market for its products. Paul Beeston, an executive
with the Toronto Blue Jays, notes that "[w]e've done a great job at growing
baseball outside the U.S. Now it's time to grow it within our borders. That
means selling the game to the 30 million Latinos in this country."'  By the
1994 season, fourteen MLB teams broadcast games in Spanish to reach
growing Latino communities in the United States."
These brief descriptions of MLB's efforts to globalize the business of
baseball suffice to show that, like other business enterprises facing the
opportunities and challenges of globalization, MLB sees its future in global
rather than national terms. Foreign baseball talent is transforming a once
homogeneous American product into an internationally diverse one. The
consumers of this globalized product are also increasingly diverse
internationally, giving MLB a global, rather than merely a national, consumer
base. MLB is clearly attempting to create the "global ballpark," an image that
echoes the broader but related concept of the global village. The benign
nature of the global ballpark image should not obscure, however, that the
managers of the global ballpark are out to make money. Behind the foreign
baseball players and consumers are globalized revenue streams for MLB
34. In the 1997 MLB season, 130 players came from Latin American countries, with fifty seven from
the Dominican Republic, twenty eight from Puerto Rico, and twenty from Venezuela. See Joseph Torres,
Latinos expanden 'la linea de color' en el bisbol 50 aRos despues de Jackie Robinson (visited Feb. 23,
1999) <http://www.latinolink.com/opinion/opinion97/0504hias.htm>.
35. On Japanese baseball, see Yoichi Nagata and John B. Holway, Japanese Baseball, in TOTAL
BASEBALL, supra note 12, at 547; ROBERT WHIIrNG, You GOTTA HAVE WA (1989); Ron Fimrite, Land
of the Rising Fastball, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, Sept. 9, 1985, at 62.
36. Japanese baseball players in MLB include: Hideo Nomo (Chicago Cubs); Masato Yoshii (New
York Mets); Hideki Irabu (New York Yankees); Shigetoshi Hasegawa (Anaheim Angels); and Mac Suzuki
(Seattle Mariners). See MLB Web Page (visited Feb. 24, 1999) <httpI/www.majorleaguebaseball.com>.
37. Quoted in Wulf, supra note 30, at 82.
38. REGALADo, supra note 30, at 204. See also Wulf, supra note 30, at 82 (noting that during the
1998 season eleven MLB teams will provide Spanish-language broadcasts).
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teams and MLB itself. The global ballpark is being built to house and advance
the global business of baseball.
II. BUILDING THE GLOBAL BALLPARK:
THE GLOBALIZATION OF BASEBALL
A. The Concept of Globalization and Baseball
Our argument that MLB is undergoing globalization requires that some
attention be focused on the concept of globalization. This concept has been
the subject of much scholarly and political debate and analysis, but
globalization is not always defined in identical ways by participants in the
discourse.39 Nor is there agreement about the impact of globalization on
politics, economics, law, and culture. These controversies make it necessary
to define as precisely as possible what we mean by the "globalization of
baseball."
Using the concept of globalization in the context of MLB might strike
some readers as odd because much of the globalization literature focuses on
how the processes of globalization-information technologies, trade, travel,
international capital movements, etc.-affect the State. A consistent theme
centers on how globalization is rendering traditional State borders permeable
and increasingly irrelevant to the organization and dynamics of human
activity. Much of the globalization literature focuses on the growth of global
markets to describe how States are losing control over what happens
economically within their territories. As Walker and Fox argued, "[tihe key
feature which underlies the concept of globalization . .. is the erosion and
irrelevance of national boundaries in markets which can truly be described as
global."I While MLB is not a State, MLB is in the process of building global
markets for its products and accessing global sources of labor.
Delbrfick defines globalization as the "process of denationalization of
markets, laws, and politics in the sense of interlacing peoples and individuals
39. See Gordon R. Walker & Mark A. Fox, Globalization: An Analytical Framework, 3 IND. J.
GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 375, 377 (1996) (noting that "[tihe concept of globalization has gained considerable
strength in recent years; its meaning, however, is often obscured in its application. Likewise, the policy
implications of globalization are not always clearly enunciated or understood.").
40. Id. at 380.
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for the sake of the common good."4' This definition helps with understanding
what we mean by the globalization of baseball. First, the denationalization of
markets is exactly what is happening with MLB: the markets for baseball
consumers and baseball talent are denationalized now, in the sense that these
markets are no longer strictly national (or American) in scope. Second, the
denationalization of baseball markets brings together people of different
countries and cultures together in common enjoyment of the sport of baseball.
Kanter observed that, in the era of globalization, "[t]he world is becoming a
global shopping mall in which ideas and products are available everywhere at
the same time."" The global ballpark image similarly captures the interlacing
of baseball fans for the common good of the sport.
No single factor accounts for the general phenomenon of globalization in
international relations. As defined by Scholte, "globalization refers to
processes whereby social relations acquire relatively distanceless and
borderless qualities, so that human lives are increasingly played out in the
world as a single place."43 As Fidler has argued, "[g]lobalization arises from
the confluence of something old and something new in international relations.
It involves the very old process of political and economic intercourse among
sovereign States. The new element is the intensification and expansion of
such intercourse made possible by technological advances in travel,
communications, and computers."" In the latter half of the twentieth century,
political, economic, technological, and cultural changes have eroded
traditional barriers, such as borders and concepts of State sovereignty.
Globalization in international relations is, thus, a very complicated
phenomenon that requires analysis of technological, organizational,
ecological, economic, political, and cultural transformations in human life.
The globalization of baseball can be seen as a subset of globalization
generally because professional baseball is also affected by globalization
processes, such as the increasing importance of non-State actors and
technological changes. A thriving baseball cyberspace exists, for example, on
41. Jost Delbrack, Globalization ofLaw, Politics, and Markets-Implications for Domestic Law--A
European Perspective, 1 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 9, 11 (1993).
42. Quoted in Jan Aart Scholte, The Globalization of World Politics, in THE GLOBALIZATION OF
WORLD POLITICS: AN INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 13, 15 (John Baylis & Steve Smith
eds., 1997).
43. Id. at 14.
44. David P. Fidler, Globalization, International Law, and Emerging Infectious Diseases, 2
EMERoING INFECTIOUS DISEASES 77, 77 (1996).
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the World Wide Web.4 The various processes of globalization affect all kinds
of business enterprises, so it is not surprising that globalization in international
relations also implicates MLB. But, business enterprises are also one of the
catalysts of globalization. Scholte writes that "globalization has been
transpiring through the proliferation and growth of companies, associations,
and regulatory agencies that operate as transborder networks.... [That] treat
the whole planet as their field of activity and regard humanity at large as their
actual or potential clients." MLB's global pursuit of foreign baseball
consumers and talent constitutes itself a process of globalization, just as
Nike's or IBM's pursuit of global markets for consumers and labor contributes
to globalization.4
B. The Processes of the Globalization of Baseball
More specifically, we can identify the processes of the globalization of
baseball-those activities that have denationalized the markets for baseball
consumers and talent in MLB. The processes of the globalization of baseball
include: global broadcasting of MLB games, global sales of MLB licensed
merchandise, MLB programs designed to increase the popularity of baseball
globally (e.g., Pitch, Hit, and Run competitions and Baseball Festivals), the
relationship between the Latin winter leagues and MLB, and the development
of the serious baseball labor market in Latin American. The next sections of
this Article look briefly at each of these processes of the globalization of
baseball.
1. International Broadcasting of MLB Games
MLB International lists 215 countries and territories in which MLB games
are now broadcast, by either American-based media companies, such as
45. See, e.g., Society for American Baseball Research (SABR) Home Page (visited Oct. 6, 1998)
<http://www.sabr.org>; John Skilton's Baseball Links Web Page (visited Feb. 23, 1999)
<http://www.baseball-links.com>; Nathan's Baseball Page (visited Feb. 17, 1999)
<littp://www.nmiia.com/-browns/framebbbhtnm>.
46. Scholte, supra note 42, at 15-16.
47. MLB is not alone among American-based professional sports in its attempts to go globaL The
National Football League (NFL), National Basketball Association (NBA), and National Hockey League
(NHL) are all involved in reaching out to foreign markets for both consumers and athletic talent In
addition, it should be remembered that soccer is already a globalized sport
1999]
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ESPN, or foreign media enterprises. 4 MLB International does over-hype its
world broadcasting because many of the countries listed, including such
baseball havens as Bangladesh and Congo, are simply served by ESPN, most
likely only at four- and five-star international hotels catering to Western
business executives. Even discounting for this puffing by MLB International,
the importance and growth of world broadcasting to MLB is clear.
As noted earlier, MLB is harnessing in its global strategies the synergy
developing between foreign baseball players in MLB and foreign baseball
consumers. It is easier to sell MLB broadcasting rights in Japan when Hideki
Irabu and other Japanese players provide a powerful connection between
Japanese baseball fans and MLB. Tim Brosnan of MLB International stated
that MLB "now wants to exploit the game's popularity in Asia and Latin
America by showcasing foreign-born players like Dodger pitchers Hideo
Nomo of Japan and Chan Ho Park of Korea."'49 During the 1997 season, for
example, each game pitched by South Korean Chan Ho Park for the Los
Angeles Dodgers was broadcast live in South Korea.' In 1998, Korean
baseball fans could tune into more than 100 games, including live telecasts of
Park's games, the All-Star Game, and the World Series." The same holds true
for MLB broadcasts in Latin America. Some of the push for world
broadcasting of MLB arises from perceptions that the U.S. domestic market
for baseball broadcasts has matured, and that broadcasting revenue growth has
to be sought overseas.52 MLB, as well as the NBA and NFL, are following in
the footsteps of manufacturing and service industries in developing export
strategies as revenues from domestic markets flatten out because the market
has matured. Some of the stagnation in the U.S. domestic baseball market has
been caused by MLB's self-inflicted wounds, as the repeated labor
controversies, such as the disastrous labor strike of 1994, have soured fans on
the nation's pastime. Baseball consumers in other countries, particularly in
Asia and Latin America, are easier targets than jaded Americans.
48. MLB Web Page (visited Feb. 16, 1999) <http://www.majorleaguebaseball.ooni/ilbi/tvlistsml>.
49. Marc Gunther, They All Want to Be Like Mike: Led by the NBA and Global Superstar Michael
Jordan, U.S. Pro Sports Leagues Are Extending Their Worldwide TVPresence All the Way from Chile to
China, FORTUNE, July 21, 1997, at 51, 52.
50. Budig, supra note 5, at 6C.
51. Id.
52. The same perception exists with the NBA. NBA Commissioner Stem said that: "There are just
so many seats in an arena and so many hours of television programming, period. The domestic business
is becoming mature. That's why we're moving internationally." Quoted in Gunther, supra note 49, at 52.
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2. Global Sales ofLicensed MLB Merchandise
Following in the footsteps of the NBA, MLB is pursuing a global strategy
of selling licensed MLB merchandise overseas. MLB licenses to domestic
and foreign enterprises the right to use insignias of MLB and MLB teams to
baseball card companies, clothing manufacturers, electronic game makers, and
others; and MLB earns big money from such licensing agreements.53 Major
League Baseball Properties (MLBP) was established in 1987 to handle the
growing licensing business. In 1998, MLBP signed agreements with
federations, teams, clubs, scouts, companies, and stores in 109 different
countries for the sale of licensed MLB merchandise.' Retail sales of licensed
MLB products are projected to grow 200% in the next five years under this
new global marketing strategy."
The global broadcasting and global licensing strategies are, of course,
intertwined. Broadcasting of MLB games in foreign countries will increase
the likelihood that fans in those countries will purchase MLB merchandise.
Through broadcasting and merchandise sales, MLB deepens its penetration of
the sports culture of the foreign countries. In countries such as Japan or
Venezuela, where baseball is already part of the respective national cultures,
MLB is exploiting emerging markets for baseball consumers. Of course, some
of these emerging markets are more lucrative than others. Despite the fact that
the Dominican Republic has sent more players to MLB than Japan, Japan is
more appealing than the Dominican Republic as a market for MLB products
because it has a developed, modem economy.
3. Global Game Development
MLB International sponsors a variety of programs designed to develop
baseball in other countries. These programs are strategically aimed primarily
at children in order to increase the likelihood that they will become consumers
of MLB products, or perhaps develop into the next Sammy Sosa. MLB
International's Envoy Program sends amateur baseball coaches overseas to
53. ZaMBALIST, supra note 12, at 57-58, 79-80.
54. MLB Web Page (visited July 20, 1998) <Ittp://www.majorleaguebasebalLcom>.
55. Id.
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teach baseball fundamentals to foreign players.m In 1997, "43 Envoy Coaches
taught in 30 countries around the world."57
MLB International's Pitch, Hit, and Run competitions overseas seeks "to
teach boys and girls of ages 9 to 12 the fundamentals of baseball. The
program is designed to put balls and bats into the hands of thousands of school
kids who have never experienced the thrill of playing baseball or teeball."
In 1997, MLB International conducted Pitch, Hit, and Run competitions in
Australia, Japan, Taiwan, Germany, Puerto Rico, Korea, and the United
Kingdom.59 In 1998, MLB International hoped to add South Africa to the list
and reach about 70,000 children internationally.6°
One curious feature of the international Pitch, Hit, and Run competitions
is that they all have taken place in developed, or relatively developed,
countries. Why not have Pitch, Hit, and Run competitions in the Dominican
Republic or Venezuela? If the objective is to put a baseball into the hands of
a child who has never held one, then targeting Germany is better than
Venezuela. But, perhaps the real objective here is not to develop the German
version of Roberto Alomar but to create a market for MLB products amongst
children in more affluent countries.
MLB International also sponsors Baseball Festivals in various countries.
According to MLB International: "Baseball festivals are interactive fan events
designed by MLBI to introduce baseball to new audiences. The festivals
recreate the sights, sounds and smells of the game-visitors are able to take
their turn at bat, clock their pitching speed, run the bases, or have their own
baseball cards made."' In 1997, MLB International held Baseball Festivals
in England, Germany, Taiwan, Australia, and Japan, with attendance over
500,000.62 In 1998, Baseball Festivals were scheduled for Venezuela,
England, Germany, and Taiwan.'
Again, apart from the Baseball Festival that took place in Venezuela,
MLB International held these events in developed countries. While this may
be motivated by the desire to spark the development of shortstops from
56. MLB Web Page (visited Oct. 2, 1998) <http'//www.majorleaguebaseball.omlndbi/gdl.sml>.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Id.
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London, it also tracks traditional marketing strategies of targeting consumers
with disposable income.
4. MLB's Relationship with the Latin Winter Leagues
Venezuela, Mexico, Puerto Rico, and the Dominican Republic have their
own professional leagues during the North American winter." MLB's
relationship with these Latin winter leagues is old. Before Jackie Robinson
broke the color bar in MLB, the Latin winter leagues provided African
American athletes with opportunities to play professional baseball.6" Later,
MLB players and coaches in need of practice and experience would play and
coach in the Latin winter leagues regularly." Eventually the Latin winter
leagues started to become important to MLB as a source of Latino baseball
players. Today, the winter leagues form part of the systematic search by MLB
teams for Latino baseball talent. The relationship between MLB and the Latin
winter leagues clearly related more to the denationalization of the market for
baseball talent than it does to the effort to build global markets of baseball
consumers.
Despite the close historical relationship between MLB and the Latin
winter leagues, tensions between the two leagues are increasing. First, MLB
has created a competing off-season league, the Arizona Fall League (AFL).67
In 1998, the AFL completed its seventh season and sported six teams that
played a schedule from the end of September to the end of November." Part
of MLB's motivation for starting the AFL was its unhappiness with American
major and minor leaguers heading south during the off-season to play in the
64. Ruck, supra note 30, at 563. Less well known is the use by a number of MLB teams of the
fledgling Australian Baseball League to provide off-season training for American minor leaguers. See Larry
Whiteside, Making Inroads Near the Outback: Sox Among Teams Exploring Australia, Where Game
Faces Major Challenges, BOSTON GLOBE, Mar. 27, 1998, at FS.
65. REOALADO, supra note 30, at 11 (noting that "American black professionals eventually competed
in Cuba to enhance their finances and gain a needed reprieve from the torrent of racial abuse in the United
States.').
66. Ruck, supra note 30, at 563.
67. See MLB Web Page (visited Feb. 18, 1999) <hUp'J/wwwnajorleaguebasebalLcom/arizona/98
overview.sml>.
68. Id. The six teams are the Grand Canyon Rafters, Maryvale Saguaros, Peoria Javelinas, Phoenix
Desert Dogs, Scottsdale Scorpions, and Sun Cities Solar Sox Id.
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Latin winter leagues, over which MLB had no control.69 More specifically,
MLB was concerned about top American baseball players getting injured
during Latin winter league play but not having access to proper medical care
and treatment.70 It is clear that the AFL is designed to serve Americans as
opposed to Latino baseball talent because its eligibility rules allow only one
foreign player on a roster who does not live in a country that participates in
the Latin winter leagues.7' The AFL represents a direct challenge to the
traditional relationship between MLB and the Latin winter leagues and to the
role the winter leagues play in the economics and societies of Latin American
countries.
Second, MLB teams have also grown more reluctant to allow many of
their important Latino players to play in the Latin winter leagues. This desire
by MLB teams to protect their investments in their Latino players was not
received well in Latin America because the winter leagues' success has been
sustained bythe regular return of Latino MLB players. In 1998, MLB and the
winter leagues signed an agreement to place their relations on a firmer
foundation. 7  An important part of this agreement is a provision that bars
Latino major and minor league players from participating inthe winter leagues
if they have pitched a certain number of innings or had a certain number of at
bats during the major and minor league seasons73 What the rest of the
agreement provides, however, remains shrouded in mystery as other terms of
the agreement have not been made public.74 Officials and persons involved in
the winter leagues in Venezuela accused MLB in early 1999 of repeated
violations of the agreement. One such alleged violation occurred when the
Arizona Diamondbacks instructed one of their pitchers, Omar Daal, not to
continue pitching in the winter league playoffs for the Leones del Caracas
69. Id. ("A concern was that with some of the very best ball players going to play Winter Ball out of
the country, such as in the Caribbean, there was no way to monitor it If Major League Baseball created
a league that it could govern and monitor, it would be better organized.").
70. Id. ("Another factor was sending the best prospects to a regulation system, so that if a player was
injured or hurt, proper care and treatment would be on hand.").
71. Id.
72. Ignacio Serrano, Bdisbol de grandea ligas evade enfrentar el "caso Daal", EL NACIONAL (Jan.
17, 1999) <http'J/www.el-nacional.com/archive>.
73. Arturo J. Marcano, Fatiga extrema H, MERIDIANO, Oct. 27, 1998, at 29.
74. Serrano, supra note 72.
75. Id.
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(Caracas Lions).7' Other Venezuelan players were also subjected to similar
orders from MLB teams.' A representative of the Leones del Caracas
claimed that this action violated the MLB winter leagues pact, and he
threatened to propose that the agreement be terminated.' In addition, the
Leones representative warned that MLB's behavior could lead to
governmental regulation against MLB scouts and academies." Based on what
follows in this Article, this warning represents a serious shot across the bow
of MLB's activities in Latin America.
5. Development of Global Markets for Baseball Talent
The globalization of baseball also features an increasingly global hunt for
baseball talent. The already significant presence of foreign players in MLB
indicates how serious the global talent hunt has become. The most serious
international market for baseball players is in Latin America, but MLB teams
are also scouting and trying to recruit talent in Asia. Most MLB teams now
seriously hunt talent in Latin American countries, through scouting and
baseball academies where MLB teams systematically evaluate baseball
prospects.
The denationalization of the market for baseball talent is a complex, and
in many ways, disturbing phenomenon. Baseball experts perceive that MLB
teams hunt so competitively in Latin America not only because Latino players
are good, but also because the quality of American baseball talent is declining.
Dick Williams, special assignment scout for the New York Yankees, believes
that "[tlhe American talent has diminished. ' "° While American Little League
continues to introduce large numbers of American children to baseball, some
experts feel that some of the passion for the game has been lost in the United
States. Joe Mcllvaine, General Manager of the New York Mets, observed:
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Id.
8o. Quoted in John Harper, The International Pastime, N.Y. DAILYNEwS, Mar. 27, 1997, at 16. See
also G. EDWARD WHITE, CREATING THE NATIONAL PASTIMB: BASEBALL TRANSFORMS ITSELF 330 (1996):
As fewer young Americans play baseball because of competition from other sports,
and fewer American families are financially able to attend games regularly, the time-
honored customs of parents playing catch with their children or taking them to the
park to watch their heroes may give way to other rituals, such as fathers or mothers
coaching youth soccer for their sons and daughters.
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You drive around and look at local ballfields in this country
and you'll find they are empty.... That's what I love about
going to Latin American countries, places like the Dominican
Republic. It's like going back in time, the way it was here in
the 1940s, '50s, and '60's. You see kids playing everywhere,
with taped-up balls, taped-up bats, whatever they've got to do
to play. That's why the search for talent is expanding world-
wide."
Behind these nostalgic images lies a more brutal socioeconomic reality.
Children in affluent America often face many kinds of opportunities and
choices. As John Harper put it, "American kids may spend more time surfing
the net these days than choosing up sides in the sandlot.'I But many children
in the developing countries of Latin America face a different present and
future. A reporter assigned to do a story on Sammy Sosa's background
captured the uglier side of children playing baseball in the Dominican
Republic: "Neighborhoods where giant hills of garbage and puddles of animal
excrement were the landscape on which children played 'baseball' with a tree
branch and a bottlecap as a ball. Man, could they hit that bottlecap. '
Lurking behind the impressive growth in the numbers of Latino ballplayers in
MLB and the increasingly competitive hunt for Latino baseball players by
MLB teams are disturbing questions about MLB profiting from the baseball
talent refined in the squalor and poverty of developing countries in Latin
America. As Roberto Gonzlez-Echevarria has argued, a serious problem with
the growing prominence of the Latin baseball market is "the widespread use
of Latino youngsters as cheap and, ultimately, disposable talent." 4 Examining
these questions reveals the dark side of the globalization of baseball, which
Parts HI and IV of this Article explore in detail.
81. Quoted in Harper, supra note 80, at 16.
82. Id.
83. Jimmy Roberts, What Must They Be Thinking? (visited Feb. 18, 1999) <http://204.202.129.20/
mlb/columns/jroberts/>.
84. Quoted in Harvey Araton, Clemente to Sosa, and Beyond, N. Y. TIMEs, Nov. 13, 1998, at DI
(Roberto Gonzblez-Echevarria is professor of Hispanic and comparative literature at Yale University and
author of the forthcoming book CUBAN BASEBALL: A CULTURAL HISTORY).
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6. Profiting from the Globalization of Baseball
The globalization of baseball is not only good for MLB but it also creates
opportunities for other business enterprises that feed off consumers of
baseball. The same synergies appear in the export strategy of the NBA. Nike
has, for example, profited from and significantly contributed to the global
fame of Michael Jordan and the growing international popularity of the NBA.
In the same manner, Coca-Cola "targets basketball-crazed teenagers by putting
NBA and team logos on Sprite soft drink cans sold in 30 countries." Scott
McCume, Coca-Cola's director of worldwide sports, says: 'We're using the
NBA and their players to help sell Sprite, but at the same time it does a lot of
good for the NBA.'" McDonald's and the NBA co-sponsor "a program called
2Ball that teaches basic basketball skills to thousands of kids outside the
U.S." 7 The same sport-corporate synergies are at work in MLB's export
strategies as well. Nike, for example, sponsors Pitch, Hit, and Run
competitions "in Asia and is the title sponsor in Japan, Korea, Taiwan and
Australia."'8
The combination of American sports and consumerism has some people
worried because "the world's kids don't need more fast food, sugared drinks,
and sports from America." 8 These concerns echo criticisms that globalization
as a general matter fosters the Americanization of national cultures, or more
harshly that globalization is American cultural imperialism. As John Galvin
noted, "American pop-culture exports often generate cries of imperialism." 8
The globalization of baseball contributes to the creation of, in Barber's term,
McWorld.9
Il. MLB's LESS FAVORABLE TREATMENT OF LATINO BASEBALL TALENT
Our basic argument against the way MLB teams locate Latino baseball
talent is that they employ methods and behavior that would not be acceptable
today in the United States. Latino baseball prospects are treated less favorably
85. Gunther, supra note 49, at 53.
86. Quoted in id.
87. Id.
88. MLB Web Page (visited Oct. 10, 1998) <http'/www.majorleaguebaseball.com/mlbi/mno.sml>.
89. Gunther, supra note 49, at 53.
90. John GalvinMaking the World SafeforMiller Lite, N.Y. TIMES MAGAZINE, Oct. 18, 1998, at 90.
91. See BENjAMINR. BARBER, JItAD VS. McWORLD: HOW THE PLANET IS BOTH FAu APARTAND
COMING ToGETHER AND WHAT THIS MEANS FOR DEmocRAcY (1995).
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by MLB teams than American baseball prospects. This less favorable
treatment is not an isolated occurrence but is a systematic problem with how
MLB teams operate in Latin America. Important to our argument is
understanding that for every Sammy Sosa, Bernie Williams, Roberto Alomar,
or Andres Galarraga, hundreds of Latino children and young men who come
into contact with MLB teams never make the big leagues. MLB teams exploit
poverty and ignorance in their efforts to bring Latino baseball players into
MLB. When baseball fans see the success of many Latino ballplayers in
MLB, "exploitation" is not what they see. They see multimillionaire
superstars. What baseball fans do not see is the treatment of the hundreds of
Latino children in so-called "baseball academies;" MLB scouts getting Latino
children to sign blank pieces of paper as "contracts" to play professional
baseball; MLB teams paying no or only paltry signing bonuses for Latino
baseball prospects; and MLB teams systematically discouraging Latino
baseball prospects from retaining agents. None of these routine MLB
practices in Latin America are tolerated today in the United States in
connection with American baseball prospects.
MLB is not responsible for the poor socioeconomic conditions in which
many Latino children live and which feed their desire to escape poverty
through professional baseball. Jimmy Roberts captured what might be going
through a Latino boy's mind when he arrives at a baseball academy:
I looked around at the training complex and its two or three
flawless practice fields, where it seemed not a blade or unruly
grass existed. It was then I really understood. What must a
child, raised in squalor and deprivation-who loves baseball
with every ounce of his fiber-feel or think when he sees this
for the first time?... Maybe he loves this game because it
represents a joyous escape from the indigent reality of his
daily life or maybe because it was a way out.92
What MLB and its teams must be held accountable for is taking advantage of
these socioeconomic circumstances in how they systematically mistreat Latino
children hungry for a life away from poverty in the American big leagues.
92. Roberts, supra note 83.
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A. The Process of Signing Baseball Talent in the United States
To understand how Latino baseball prospects are systematically treated
less favorably than their American counterparts, it is necessary to know how
American baseball prospects find their way into the big leagues. Today, the
annual amateur baseball draft controls how baseball players from the amateur
ranks in the United States, Canada, and Puerto Rico are brought into the
professional game.93 When a prospect is drafted, the MLB team that drafted
him has exclusive negotiating rights with him;94 this prevents MLB teams from
engaging in a bidding war for North American and Puerto Rican talent. Not
only does the draft provide a transparent and open process for North American
and Puerto Rican baseball prospects, but it also helped "to stop the upward
spiral of [signing] bonuses and to distribute talent more evenly.""
Prior to the 1965 institution of the draft, American baseball amateur
players were free agents and could sign with whatever team made the most
attractive offer. This system placed a premium on a MLB team's scouting
system because the better the scouting the better the prospects of landing the
best amateur players. Because extensive scouting systems cost money, the
free agency framework favored richer teams, such as the New York Yankees,
which could afford not only the scouts but also the signing bonuses demanded
by highly recruited ballplayers. As a general matter, teams with more money
had more scouts; and the teams with more scouts tended to attract more good
ballplayers. Good ballplayers meant winning teams, and winning teams
attracted younger players and meant more profits for the owners.9 Before the
draft, scouting was at the very heart of the American business of baseball.
This scouting system ultimately proved, however, bad for the baseball
business. First, competition for baseball talent caused expenses to rise as
more scouts were needed and higher signing bonuses and salaries were paid
to hotly recruited players. Simpson records that upward pressure on signing
bonuses began during World War II, prompting MLB team owners in 1946 to
make the first attempt to slow down the escalation in signing bonuses by
93. On the amateur draft generally, see Allan Simpson, The Amateur Draft, in TOTAL BASEBALL,
supra note 12, at 608.
94. Id. at 609.
95. Id. at 608.
96. See id. at 609. Lee MacPhail, who was instrumental in the dominance of the New York Yankees
in the 1950's and 1960's observed: "We won the World Series five years in a row. Kids wanted to sign
with the Yankees, the most glamorous team in baseball at the time." Quoted in id.
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fining teams for exceeding fixed bonus limits.' Teams quickly discovered,
however, ways to get around the fixed bonus rule." In 1958, MLB adopted a
new rule requiring players paid bonuses over certain fixed amounts to be
placed directly on the big league roster." This rule proved ineffective in
preventing signing bonuses from escalating further. 0 Between 1958 and
1963, MLB teams spent an estimated $45 million in signing bonuses and first-
year salaries;' 0' and, in 1964, MLB teams paid $7 million to amateur players,
which was "more than was spent on major league salaries."' "°e
Second, because the system favored rich teams over less affluent ones, it
threatened to produce competitive disequilibrium in the sport with rich teams
winning consistently and poor teams losing regularly. Such disequilibrium
would be bad for the overall business of baseball as fans would get bored with
the same teams always winning pennants and World Series. Bored fans
would mean less ticket and other revenues for team owners.
The draft terminated the economics of the scouting system in professional
baseball. It was primarily a business strategy to improve the overall MLB
product and to lower the cost of producing the product. The draft was, thus,
an efficiency strategy: produce a better product at lower cost.' The draft had
three general impacts on the way American ballplayers came into the major
leagues. First, the draft accorded more protection to baseball players because
the process was formal and transparent, so vulnerable teenagers did not have
to deal with smooth-talking MLB scouts. Second, scouts were largely
removed from the process of signing a player, as the draft determined where
a player would play. Third, scouts essentially became talent filters for the
decisionmaking process imposed by the draft. While scouting remains
important, scouts in the United States, Canada, and Puerto Rico have less
power today than they did during the years of amateur free agency.
97. Id. at 608.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. See John Thom, Our Game, in TOTAL BASEBALL, supra note 12, at 5, 10. Thom notes that "the
pennant domination by the three New York teams-principally the Yankees, of course-made the national
pastime a rather parochial pleasure; it was hard for fans in Pittsburgh or Detroit to wax rhapsodic over a
Subway Series." Id.
104. Simpson argues that the draft largely achieved this objective: "Payments to untried amateur
players were kept in line until the late 1980s, while new meaning has been given to competitive balance."
Simpson, supra note 93, at 609.
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The draft also empowers amateur ballplayers in their dealings with MLB
teams because it provides opportunities for many ballplayers to retain agents
to help them in negotiations with teams that draft them. Agents can help level
the economic playing field in contract negotiations between teenagers and
savvy business executives. In addition, as most American baseball prospects
and their parents have received formal education, MLB teams cannot
systematically dupe American players and their parents in contract
negotiations.
Other protections exist for American baseball prospects as they prepare
for the world of MLB. First, baseball prospects typically arrive in MLB
through very formal and organized systems, from Little League through high
school into university. Once upon a time scouts used to find the farm boy with
no formal baseball training who was a "natural;" but, today, most American
MLB players come up through the formal system in place throughout the
United States. Importantly, much of this system is linked to educational
institutions so that baseball prospects also receive formal education. While
high schoolers used to make up the majority of MLB draftees, today university
ballplayers constitute the dominant source of talent in the draft."5 Thus,
current American draftees are older, more mature, and better educated than
draftees in the early years of the draft.
Second, private and public regulatory regimes protect baseball prospects
from unscrupulous agents. The National Collegiate Athletic Association
(NCAA) imposes rules on its member universities that regulate student-athlete
contact with agents and with professional teams."° Many state legislatures
have also enacted laws that regulate how agents may deal with athletes in their
jurisdictions.' While these private and public regulatory regimes are not
perfect as abuses and problems continue to occur, they offer American
105. Id.
106. See Lionel S. Sobel, The Regulation of Sports Agents: An Analytical Primer, 39 BAYLOR L
REv. 701, 768-69 (1987) ("The NCAA has long had many rules that make student-athletes ineligible for
NCAA competition if they engage in certain conduct. Ineligibility may result... from an agreement by
the athlete... to be represented by an agent"). See also GLENN M. WONG, ESSENTIALs OF AMATEUR
SPORTS LAW 303-04 (2d ed. 1994) (discussing NCAA eligibility rules in connection with professional
contracts).
107. See Sobel, supra note 106, at 724-25 (describing agent regulation plans adopted by state
legislatures in the United States); and WONG, supra note 106, at 671 (providing an overview of state
legislation regulating sports agents). See also Linda S. Calvert Hanson, The Florida Legislature Revisits
the Regulation and Liability of Sports Agents and Student Athletes, 25 STETSON L REV. 1067, 1068 n7
(1996) (listing the legislation of twenty-four states that regulate agents).
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baseball amateurs some protection against the economic forces at work in
professional baseball.
This brief overview of the process by which an American baseball
prospect becomes part of MLB demonstrates that the process accords many
types of protections for American amateurs. The protections come in a variety
of forms: the draft; the availability of agents and the economic incentives
fueling agency relationships; organized, formal training systems linked to
secondary and higher education; general socioeconomic advantages available
in the United States; private regulatory rules; and public laws. While not
perfect, the overall situation gives American baseball prospects advantages,
benefits, and protections in their dealings with MLB teams.
B. The Process of Signing Baseball Talent in Latin America
None of the protections available to American baseball prospects are
generally available to Latino children and teenagers recruited by MLB
teams.' This less advantageous situation partially arises from the less
affluent socioeconomic conditions generally present in Latin American
countries. But MLB teams generally make little effort to afford Latino
baseball prospects with some minimum standards of treatment and take
advantage of poverty and ignorance in signing Latino baseball prospects. The
intentional exploitation of youngsters in poor countries has long been a factor
in MLB teams' interest in Latino talent.0 9 This reality is widely known, often
admitted,"0 and has been brought to the attention of the MLB Commissioner
108. See Ross Newhan, The Great Escape: America's Pastime is Also Pedro Guerrero 's Passport,
L.A. TIMES, Jan. 7, 1985, available in WESTLAW, ALLNEWS PLUS (noting that the Dominican Republic
"is an open market ungoverned by baseball's amateur draft, a last great hunting ground for eager scouts who
are able to sign equally eager prospects for bonuses far below those demanded by already jaded U.S.
players. There are no college-scholarship opportunities here to increase a player's value."). Similar
ungoverned markets exist in other Latin American countries.
109. See Steve Aschbumer, Twins Get Back in Step with the Latin Beat, MNNEAPOLIS-ST. PAUL
STAR-TRIB., May 21, 1989, at IC (explaining that the reason MLB teams got interested in Latino talent in
the 1950's was because "teams could exploit underdeveloped countries, signing players from impoverished
backgrounds to paltry contracts.').
110. See id. at 1C (noting that MLB "teams still will plead guilty to taking advantage of them as a
cheap source of talert.").
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in the past."' Thus, MLB teams and MLB treat Latino baseball talent less
favorably than American prospects in a systematic and intentional way. Such
systematic less favorable treatment arises in three general areas: (1) the
scouting process in Latin America; (2) the baseball academies; and (3) the role
of agents in the signing of Latino baseball players.
1. The Scouting Process in Latin America
As indicated earlier, the institution of the draft in 1965 dramatically
altered the role of scouting in MLB in the United States. Scouting plays a
major role in MLB teams' hunt for baseball talent in Latin America because
Latino players (excluding those in Puerto Rico) are not included in the draft.
In fact, scouting has developed an importance for MLB in Latin America that
echoes the old role of scouting in the United States, but so far without the
negative consequences for MLB teams. In addition, the pre-draft economics
of signing American ballplayers encouraged MLB teams to look south for
cheaper talent. "1
2
Scouting has gone global as the game has globalized. Again, this was a
gradual rather than an overnight process. MLB teams began to scout in Latin
American countries in the 1950s,"' but today the scale of the scouting has
reached impressive proportions. The competition for Latino baseball talent,
the decline in the North American talent pool, and the presence of the baseball
academies have combined to increase the number of scouts and the intensity
of their activities in Latin American countries."14
Such scouting intensity in Latin America might suggest that scouting for
Latino talent might be following the pattern seen in the pre-draft days in the
United States: higher and higher costs favoring rich teams, with the process
accompanied by rule-breaking. Just as in the pre-draft days in the United
111. See Newhan, supra note 108. Newhan reported that in 1985 that the MLB Commissioner's:
office has been looking into the possibility that some U.S. teams have been
exploiting the situation, attempting to comer the market by signing very young
Dominicans for very little money, or by teams staging tryout camps and baseball
academies, requiring players to sign an attendance agreement, which they later claim
is a binding contract.
Id.
112. REGALADO, supra note 30, at 59.
113. Id. at 57 ("Throughout the 1950s, expanded scouting efforts brought players from the Dominican
Republic, Puerto Rico, and Central America.").
114. See id. at 58 (mentioning the "great influx of scouts" into Latin American countries).
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States, rich teams have an advantage in the hunt for Latino talent. As John
Harper observed, "[b]ecause players outside the U.S. aren't subject to the
amateur draft, clubs willing to scout and spend have an advantage.""' To
date, however, the scouting process in Latin American countries has not
produced the kinds of expensive bidding wars witnessed in the pre-draft days
of MLB."6 The power of the MLB scouts vis-d-vis a baseball prospect in
Latin America is greater than it was in the United States (generally speaking)
because of the poverty and relative lack of education suffered by the prospect
and his family. As a representative of a MLB team, a scout with the power to
sign prospects has tremendous leverage over a vulnerable young player from.
a poverty-stricken country."7 In addition, although many MLB teams scout
in Latin America, potential prospects may not see scouting frenzies over their
talent because the scouting system is not as well structured as the pre-draft
American system was. These factors lead to Latino prospects who are
generally willing to sign anything a MLB scout puts in front of them without
receiving anything close to the kind of signing bonuses received by American
baseball draftees.
While the scouting for Latino talent has not yet produced expensive
bidding wars between MLB teams, the fierce competition is producing
questionable practices and behavior that breaks or bends MLB rules on
signing baseball prospects-just as witnessed in the pre-draft days in the
United States. First, scouts for MLB teams now try to sign as many players
as possible to prevent other teams from contracting with them."8 MLB teams
and their scouts feel pressure to produce a larger flow of prospects into their
baseball academies in order to find the gems that will go on to professional
115. Harper, supra note 80, at 16.
116. Some upward pressure on signing bonuses for Latino prospects has, however, been noted in a
few cases. See Jack Wilkinson, Baseball Dreamers: The Road to Turner Field, ATLANTA JOURNAL-
CONSTITUTION, Aug. 16, 1998, at El. These cases remain the exception and not the rle for Latino baseball
prospects. In 1986, the average signing bonus for an American first-round draft pick was between $80,000
and $100,000. Signing bonuses for Dominican players ran from $3,000 to $5,000. DeVoss, supra note
33, at 10. In 1993, the average signing bonus for a first-round draft pick was $611,000. Simpson, supra
note 93, at 610. In 1991, Klein reported that Puerto Rican draft picks commonly get signing bonuses of
$100,000. ALAN M. KLEIN, SUGARBALL: THE AMERICAN GAME, THE DOMINICAN DREAM 61 (1991).
117. See REOALADO, supra note 30, at 60-61 (noting that poor Latin American ballplayers were
"vulnerable to exploitation" through meager salaries and lack of bonuses). See also Newhan, supra note
108 (quoting Los Angeles Dodger star Pedro Guerrero, a native of the Dominican Republic, stating that
"[t]he scouts look at the way guys live here and figure they can offer anything, and it's the truth... The
kids are just looking to sign and get out of here.").
118. The early days of scouting were less pressure-filled as scouts could be selective and save some
prospects for closer scrutiny during the next season. See REGALADO, supra note 30, at 58..
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ball in the United States. Thus, more Latino children are being brought into
MLB's system without any improvement in their chances to play baseball
professionally in the United States. The number of children brought into the
academies and then released back into poverty after one or two years is
increasing." 9 The social penetration of the MLB system has become deeper
and more malignant. Some respected Latino baseball figures, such as Felipe
Alou, have criticized MLB teams for over-signing Latino children.12 0
Second, the fierce competition for Latino baseball talent is forcing the
scouting process to affect children at younger and younger ages. It is
generally known that scouts in Latin America routinely begin calling on
players and their families when the children are only twelve or thirteen years
old."' Scouts often use gifts to gain the confidence of families and to build a
relationship that the scout hopes will build loyalty to the MLB team he
represents. As the relationship is established, the scout begins to exercise
more control, instructing the children and families not to deal with other
teams, scouts, or agents. 23 Eventually, the child and parents sign a "contract,"
are promised a signing bonus, and the child is sent to a baseball academy. 24
In Venezuela, it is also widely known that some MLB teams are even
"buying" little league teams to get a head start on the competition."u The
scheme works like this: for around $200 a month, the manager of the little
league team sends a monthly report to the scout to let him know if a good
prospect is blooming. 6 Then the scout can act on this exclusive information
and sign the child before the competition.127 Incredible as it may seem, MLB
teams' farm systems now extend all the way down to Latino little league
teams, meaning that MLB's human commodities are getting younger in Latin
America to satisfy the need for profits in the United States.
119. Regalado notes that in 1990, "49 Dominicans were on big league rosters while 325 toiled inthe
minor league, [and] 400 were in various academies." Id. at 202. By these numbers, for every one
Dominican big league player there are approximately fifteen Dominican minor leaguers and academy
attendees whose chances of making the big leagues are slim.
120. OLEK&AK AND OLEKSAK, supra note 30, at 184 (quoting Alou as arguing that "[tihey sign 25
guys and maybe only one is a good player. It's like they throw a net in the ocean, hoping that maybe they'll
get a big fish. The problem is, if they don't get a big fish, they'll throw all the smaller ones back.").
121. These observations derive from the knowledge and experience gained by Arturo Marcano in his
years of involvement with professional and amateur baseball in Latin America.
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. Id.
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In his study of baseball in the Dominican Republic, Alan Klein asserted
that the coming of the baseball academies and the passage of legislation
regulating scouting put an end to the rapacious behavior of scouts, who would
lie to and cheat baseball prospects and their parents and in some cases isolate
prospects from other teams and scouts." Klein argued that the techniques of
MLB scouts in the Dominican Republic "were reminiscent of those of the
West African slave traders of three centuries earlier."'29 But Klein's belief,
stated in the early 1990s in connection with the Dominican Republic, that
"[tihe free-roving scouts of the 1970s gave way to baseball academies...
[which] made the process of securing talent grow less brigandish, more
routinized, and more civilized"'" does not accurately describe what happens
today all over Latin America. Scouts remain essential for feeding Latino
children into the baseball academies, as evidenced by the numbers of scouts
combing the ball fields around Latin America. And their techniques, refined
under the fierce competition for baseball prospects, seem increasingly
reminiscent of the rapacity of the earlier age of scouting.
Klein also asserted that a law passed by the Dominican Republic in 1984
"did much to protect young Dominican athletes from the more rapacious
scouts and organizations."'' While Klein may have been right about the
initial impact of the law, all we could elicit from people familiar with scouting
practices in the Dominican Republic was laughter when the matter of this law
was raised. This reaction suggested to us that the law regulating scouts in the
Dominican Republic was not having much of an impact on scouting practices.
In addition, other countries crawling with MLB scouts, such as Venezuela,
have no such regulations at all. Even Klein's own analysis undermines his
assertions about improvements in scouting in the Dominican Republic. He
noted that not all abuses had been corrected and that "[c]heating young
hopefuls out of their due continues despite decrees against it."'3
In connection with Latino talent, the MLB rules being routinely violated
by MLB scouts and teams are: (1) the rule prohibiting the signing of
128. KLEIN, supra note 116, at 42.
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. Id. at 43. For an English translation of this law, see AARON N. WISH AND BRUCE S. MEYER,
2 INTERNATIONAL SPORTS LAW AND BUSINESS 889 (1997).
132. KLEIN, supra note 116, at 54.
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prospects under the age of seventeen (17-year old rule),'33 and (2) the rule that
all players signed must sign a standard player's contract (SPK) agreed
between MLB and the Major League Baseball Players Association
(MLBPA).'1 MLB teams will often sign Latino prospects at ages younger
than permitted by the 17-year old rule. A frequent practice is the signing of
sixteen-year old prospects regardless of the provisions of the 17-year old rule.
Then MLB teams have such prospects sign "contracts" (sometimes just blank
pieces of paper) that do not conform to the SPK. Once the prospect is signed,
the MLB team tries to hide him from the eyes of other scouts and MLB teams,
usually in a baseball academy. When the player reaches the age when he can
be legitimately signed, the MLB team will sign him to a SPK, thus making
everything look legitimate.135
A famous situation involves Bernie Williams, now a superstar for the New
York Yankees. The Yankees discovered Williams in Puerto Rico in the 1980s
when scout Fred Ferreiro saw him play." Fearing that other teams would also
see Williams's talent, the Yankees wanted to get Williams under contract; but
he was not old enough to sign the SPK under the 17-year old rule. 37 So, the
Yankees simply brought Williams to the United States to keep him away from
other teams." s When Williams was old enough to be signed, the Yankees
signed him with a $16,000 signing bonus.3 9 Even though the Yankees did not
break any rules or laws in what they did with Williams, it is a depressing sign
of the fiercely competitive world of Latino scouting in the era of the
globalization of baseball.
While it might be hard to feel sorry for Bernie Williams because he is now
a baseball superstar with a new $87 million contract, what happened to him
and what routinely happens to Latino children at the hands of MLB scouts and
133. The rule provides that a player who is not already under contract with a MLB or minor league
team, who is not a U.S. resident, and who is not subject to draft eligibility rules, may be signed by any club
if(l) he is seventeen years old at the time of signing, or (2) he is sixteen years old upon signing and will
reach seventeen prior to the later of (a) the conclusion of the baseball season in which he was signed, and
(b) September 1. See WoNG, supra note 106, at 635.
134. MLB Standard Player's Contract (on file with authors).
135. These observations derive from the knowledge and experience gained by Arturo Marcano in his
years of involvement with professional and amateur baseball in Latin America.
136. Thomas R. Dominczyk, Comment, The New Melting Pot: As American Attitudes Toward
Foreigners Continue to Decline, AthletesAre Welcomed with Open Arms, 8 SETON HALL . SPORTS L 165,
18 (1998).
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. Id.
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teams would not happen to an American prospect because legal, MLB, and
cultural barriers exist to such treatment of American children. In addition,
Williams's success is the exception not the rule in terms of MLB treatment of
Latino children. Of the hundreds of Latino children signed by scouts and
shipped off to baseball academies, only a handful ever make it to the United
States to play minor league ball; and even fewer make it to the Big Show.
Everyone marvels at the baseball skills of Bernie Williams but never sees or
cares what happens to the hundreds of other prospects who did not make the
cut. After years of struggling in baseball academies and/or the minors, they
generally return home without fame, fortune, or formal education. The
prospects for these former players are in most cases dim.'4' While a Latino
teenager may still make the big leagues, he probably will not based on
statistical averages. In many cases, the MLB team's violation of the 17-year
old rule and the SPK rule and shielding prospects from contact with
knowledgeable people who could rectify their treatment would not happen
today to an American. Given that such treatment of Latino children is not
uncommon, a dark cloud hangs over this part of MLB activities in Latin
America.
2. The "Baseball Academies"
A number of MLB teams operate "baseball academies" in Latin American
countries through which they evaluate prospective Latino baseball players.
Baseball academies "started in the late seventies and flourished by the
mideighties."' 4 The Toronto Blue Jays built the first baseball academy in
1975, and today many MLB teams operate baseball academies in countries
140. Wilkinson reported, for example, that "[nlo player has ever started with the Dominican Braves
and worked his way through the farm system to reach Atlanta." Wilkinson, supra note 116, at El. DeVoss
reported that "only 3% of the players signed ever reach the big leagues." DeVoss, supra note 33, at 10.
See also Aschbumer, supra note 109, at IC ("For every Hispanic player who finds success in America,
hundreds more fall short of the dream and return home, scraping out their existence.").
141. Dario Paulino, a coach for the Atlanta Braves in the Dominican Republic, noted that it is "very,
very hard" when Latino players fail to make it to the American big leagues. Quoted in Wilkinson, supra
note 116, at El. Luis Silverio, a scout for the Kansas City Royals, admitted that "[t]he worst thing about
my job is when you have to release them from [the academy] .... You gotta see their face. After the
disappointment sets in they ask, 'What am I going to do now?"' Quoted in Dave Hoekstra, A Land ofHope,
Dreams: Cubs Seek Untapped Talent in the Dominican Republic, CH SuN-TIMos, Feb. 29, 1988, at 12.
142. RBOALADO, supra note 30, at 201.
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such as the Dominican Republic and Venezuela. 4 ' Regalado observes that the
baseball academies "contributed much to the Latin increase in the big
leagues."'" Thus, these baseball academies play an important role in MLB
teams' hunt for Latino baseball talent.
Klein described baseball academies in terms familiar from discourse about
neocolonialism: "it finds raw materials (talented athletes), refines them (trains
the athletes), and ships abroad finished products (baseball players).' 45 This
description also resonates with our earlier arguments about baseball being a
global business. The neocolonial image can be further enhanced by observing
that MLB teams have built baseball academies where the raw materials are
plentiful, pliant, and cheap to harvest compared to indigenous sources of
baseball talent.46 Baseball academies can also be seen as strategies to achieve
economies of scale in the production of baseball players. Interestingly, one
Japanese corporation not affiliated with professional baseball proposed to
transform neocolonialism into full-blown capitalism by setting up a baseball
academy "to produce players for sale on the world market." 47 Even Fidel
Castro has expressed a desire to "export" Cuban baseball players to MLB for
a profit rather than having them defect to the United States."
In addition, neocolonialism as a description also fits with the involvement
of local elites in the business at hand. The lack of implementation and
enforcement of Dominican Republic regulations on the operation of scouts
and baseball academies suggests that collusion neocolonial-style occurs.'49
Collusion of the periphery with the core also probably exists because of the
143. OLEKSAK & OLEKSAK, supra note 30, at 186.
144. REGALADO, supra note 30, at 201.
145. KLEIN, supra note 116, at 42.
146. Id. at 55 ("Lured by a cheap and docile labor force, corporations in industrial countries move
their manufacturing plants off-shore.").
147. Id. at 52.
148. See Rich Oppel, Castro Asks for Cut of Baseball Profit (visited Feb. 23, 1999)
<http://www.latinolink.com/sports/sports98/1026seas.htm>. See also Tom Farrey, Traitor to the Heart
(visited Feb. 26, 1999) <http://espn.go.com/gen/columns/farrey/01121832.htmil> (reporting on Castro's
efforts to make it more difficult for Cuban baseball players to defect to the United States).
149. Klein noted that the Dominican government intervened in 1984 to regulate the appalling
behavior of not only scouts but also baseball academies, which "signed as many players as possible (some
as young as thirteen) and separated them from their families without any consideration of the consequences,
hid the boys so that other scouts would not get hold of them, and failed to pay bonuses that were promised."
KLEIN, supra note 116, at 43. While Klein stated that this regulatory intervention had salutary effects, he
observed in a footnote that the 1985 appointment of the Dominican baseball commissioner to oversee
relations between MLB teams and Dominican players lapsed two years later and had not been renewed as
of 1990. Id. at 164 n.25.
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economic importance of the baseball academies to these impoverished
communities. Threats of divestment help reinforce the cooperation of the
locals. As Klein noted in connection with the Dominican Republic, "[s]ome
teams even get their way by threatening to leave the country if they are
interfered with by the government."' -,
For MLB teams, baseball academies serve several important functions.
First, the scouts can sign promising young children (often violating MLB rules
in the process) and send then to the academies for intensive training until they
turn seventeen. Second, the baseball academies attract young players who
have not yet been signed, allowing MLB teams to test these prospects out
under rigorous training conditions. Third, the baseball academies are great
places to isolate young talent from the eyes of other teams and the hands of
agents. Fourth, prospects that survive the baseball academies and show great
promise usually are easy and cheap to sign because they have invested so
much of themselves in the particular team that they are very unlikely to look
at other teams for employment. Finally, the baseball academies serve as
convenient holding pens for talented players as MLB teams get only a limited
number of immigration visas each year for foreign players. 5'
The baseball academies are basically baseball boot camps for Latino
children. The average age of children attending the academies is between
twelve and sixteen years."' Although MLB rules prohibit a team from signing
any player to a contract before he is seventeen, the rule does not prevent MLB
teams from systematically evaluating children younger than seventeen in the
baseball academies."' Latino children sometimes spend up to three years in
baseball academies."4 While MLB claims to monitor the treatment of children
attending baseball academies,"' these operations submit Latino children to
questionable treatment and interfere with their education.
The daily regimen at baseball academies is generally quite rigorous." 6
While such regimens have benefits in connection with instilling discipline,
150. Id. at 54.
151. For discussion of the limitations imposed by U.S. visa restrictions, see id. at 56-57.
152. These observations derive from the knowledge and experience gained by Arturo Marcano in his
years of involvement with professional and amateur baseball in Latin America.
153. Id.
154. Id.
155. See OLEKSAK & OLEKSAK, supra note 30, at 187.
156. See KLEIN, supra note 116, at 73-74 (describing the "rigidly structured daily regimen" at the Los
Angeles Dodgers' baseball academy in the Dominican Republic); Wilkinson, supra note 116, at El
(describing daily routine at Atlanta Braves' baseball academy in the Dominican Republic).
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they have potential problems as well. First, whether such physically and
mentally demanding regimens are appropriate for children to endure for years
is open to question. Second, it is not clear that the rigor of life in the
academies is always geared toward nurturing baseball talent. Many Latino
players who have experienced life in the baseball academies report being
subject to very hard physical and emotional conditions, including oral and
physical abuse and lack of proper medical treatment for injuries." 7 Injuries
to players sometimes result not in medical attention but in release from the
academy." If they have come to the academy after signing a contract, getting
injured often results in the signing bonus never being paid." 9 Money to help
the child and his family take care of the injury sustained in the academy is
often not offered by the MLB team. 11
Scouts and baseball academies are often less than family oriented in the
attempt to protect prospects from being pilfered by other MLB scouts and
teams. Klein related how "many academies often hide their prospects,
bringing forth charges of kidnaping."'' A former Dominican baseball
commissioner once stated: 'These camps were hideouts because the scouts
didn't want their kids seen by other scouts. It almost seemed like they were
concentration camps."'"
While not as bad as the sweatshop environments suffered by child laborers
in many developing countries, these observations point toward questionable
treatment of children by MLB teams. It is inconceivable that American
children could be exposed to such treatment in the United States by MLB
teams. More generally, it is worrying to learn that MLB teams systematically
treat Latino children in this way.
One defense of this sort of treatment is that it is perhaps better than the
daily existence of most of the children in attendance. More flattering
descriptions of life in baseball academies can be found. Although he retains
a critical eye, Klein's description of the Los Angeles Dodgers' baseball
academy at Campus Las Palmas in the Dominican Republic is, on the whole,
157. These observations derive from the knowledge and experience gained by Arturo Marcano in his
years of involvement with professional and amateur baseball in Latin America.
158. Id.
159. Id.
160. Id.
161. KLEN, supra note 116, at 53.
162. Quoted in id. at 54.
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fairly positive. 63 Former major leaguers who now work in the baseball
academies stress the physical benefits of life in the academies, as the boys are
treated for intestinal parasites, fed nutritious food, and generally grow
healthier than they would in their squalor-ridden neighborhoods.'" The boys
get plenty of physical exercise, learn discipline and teamwork, and become
motivated to achieve goals large and small. When contrasted to the grinding
poverty beyond the academy's walls,'65 the atmosphere within the walls can
seem positively humanitarian. The image given by these descriptions is one
of opportunity not exploitation, and it connects powerfully with the "rags-to-
riches" mythology of American baseball:
A kid with nothing to his name except talent and desire works
hard, harder even than the other kids working hard toward the
same goal. In time, he goes from playing baseball with a
cardboard glove and a ball of taped socks on a comer sandlot,
through tough times on the road in semi-pro leagues and on
to pro ball. One day, and for years after that, he plays in
Dodger Stadium. The story is as old as Abner Doubleday and
as American as the game itself. ... This is about Latin
baseball players, who they are, how they got to The Show and
what it took to get there.I"
This Horatio Alger mythology also appears in the attitudes of American
MLB scouts traveling the poverty-drenched areas of Latin America. Deric
Ladnier, director of the Atlanta Braves' minor league operations, complained
that economic affluence has diluted the passion for baseball in American boys;
but, referring to the Dominican Republic, Ladnier gushed: 'Vhen you come
down here and you're looking for baseball players and you see people playing
on street comers and in fields, you think, 'What a great place to come. They
163. Id. at 62-103.
164. See Hoekstra, supra note 141, at 12 (noting efforts by the Chicago Cubs to rid prospects of
parasites and to provide them with good nutrition); and REOALADO, supra note 30, at 201-02 (quoting
Ralph Avila of the Los Angeles Dodgers who stated that "the Dodgers promise three meals a day, a bed,
a physical examination, any necessary dental work, prescription drugs and vitamins, classes in Spanish, an
English teacher, transportation to and from the ball park and free laundry.").
165. Regalado notes that the baseball academies "became temporary sanctuaries from poverty" for
young persons in the Dominican Republic. REOALADO, supra note 30, at 201.
166. T.R. Reinman, Getting to First Base: Latins Have Earned Their Place in Major Leagues, SAN
DiHOoUNioN-TRIB., July 9, 1991, at Dl.
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play."" 67 Latin American countries are attractive to MLB because the field
of dreams is built upon poverty and near hopelessness. What a great place to
come. That's what I love about going to Latin American countries. Man,
could they hit that bottlecap.
The projection of the "rags-to-riches" mythology onto the exploitation of
Latino children by MLB represents profound ethical myopia by the American
baseball world. First, the mythology neglects to take into account the
negligible economic benefits of baseball to the general populations of Latin
American countries. Klein contrasted the economic success of a handful of
Dominican baseball players with the continuing and distressing
socioeconomic conditions in the Dominican Republic." In connection with
baseball, Klein argues that "the Dominicans' economic and political
dependence on industrialized nations is both their best hope for the future and
a leading cause of their underdevelopment."' 69  Second, this projection of
American baseball mythology essentially holds that it is acceptable to treat
poor children worse than affluent children because they are poor. Systematic
and intentional discrimination based on economic status is not a shining
beacon in favor of MLB's practices in Latin American countries.
3. The Role ofAgents in Signing Latino Baseball Players
Sport agents, or athlete agents, have become a bigger part of professional
sports in the United States in the last thirty years. In earlier decades,
professional athletes negotiated their own contracts because they had few
alternatives to what their teams offered. In MLB, players were for decades
bound to a team through the reserve clause, which drastically limited a
player's negotiating freedom. The reserve clause in a player's contract
essentially bound "a player in perpetuity to a single club.""7 ' Despite its
unfairness, the reserve clause survived from the late nineteenth century until
the mid-1970s.'7 ' After the demise of the reserve clause, the bargaining
leverage of players began to increase through the advent of free agency,
litigation, and collective bargaining. In addition, as professional sports grew
into multi-billion dollar industries, players needed more and more professional
167. Quoted in Wilkinson, supra note 116, at El.
168. See KLON, supra note 116, at60.
169. Id.
170. Pieftusza, supra note 12, at 590.
171. Id. at 588-90.
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representation to level the playing field of contract and product endorsement
negotiations. All these factors have led to sports agency being something of
a boom industry in the United States over the past three decades.
Sports agents are generally thought of as the individuals who negotiate
contracts for athletes. However, the agent performs a variety of functions in
representing the professional athlete. For example, in addition to negotiating
the player's contract, the agent might furnish the player with the following
services: legal counseling; obtaining and negotiating endorsement and
publishing contracts; financial management and accounting; insurance,
investment, tax and estate planning; present and post-athletic career
counseling; public relations; coordinating travel arrangements; resolving
disputes that arise under the athlete's employment contract and collective
bargaining agreement; soliciting, negotiating and securing additional income
opportunities; and providing financial advice and income management
services and furnishing general guidance on legal tax issues. 7
While few will argue that the services of a competent agent can be very
valuable for a professional athlete, the emergence of the sports agent in
professional sports has not been without problems. First, the fierce
competition for a limited supply of quality athletes has encouraged
corruption." Until recently, unscrupulous or corrupt agents had everything
to gain and nothing to lose by breaking the rules in the aggressive hunt for
talented clients. Many agents offered money or gifts to talented college
players to sign with them representation agreements before the expiration of
their collegiate eligibility.1 74 Stricter laws have been passed to correct this
situation, as noted above.
Second, there are not professional requirements or standards to which
agents must comply, even though they perform professional services for their
athlete clients. The agency industry has evolved beyond just contract
negotiation. In fact, many agents now provide many additional professional
172. See Sobel, supra note 106, at 705-09 (discussing different functions of sports agents); WONG,
supra note 106, at 666-71 (discussing the same).
173. Leigh Steinberg, How the Agent-Athlete Relationship Begins (visited Feb. 25, 1999)
<http'//esp~go.com/ge/columnsleighsteinberg/00731332.html> (noting that 20,000 sports agents in the
United States are competing to represent 200 NFL draft picks, 58 NBA draft picks, and several hundred
MLB draft picks).
174. See WONO, supra note 106, at 664-65 (quoting Leigh Steinberg, a leading sports agent, who
alleged that "at least one third of the top athletes in college football and basketball are signing early every
year. It is usually done in return for money payments. It is an open secret no one wants to talk about It
is unconscionable.").
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services as noted above. Few agents have expertise in all areas, yet many of
them attempt to compete with those who have such professional knowledge.
Because of the abuses in the agent-player relationship, measures have been
taken to regulate sports agents in the United States by the MLBPA,'75 the
NCAA, 1'76 and state legislatures.'"
As baseball has gone global in the search for talent, agents are also trying
to go global. Sports agents are not, as a general matter, regulated in Latin
American countries. Agent abuses similar to those that occur in the United
States are also happening with Latino baseball players. The larger problem
with Latino baseball prospects is not, however, agent abuses; but, rather, the
lack of agent involvement in the signing of Latino ball players by MLB teams.
Agents are necessary in the various worlds of professional sports; but, in
the case of foreign players, the role of agents is even more important than for
American players because of economic, educational, language, and cultural
barriers that foreign players face. Many Latino players lack the education or
language skills to discuss or even ask for benefits normally given to American
players. Such educational and language obstacles put them at a disadvantage
when dealing with MLB teams. In addition, given that many Latino baseball
prospects see MLB as their escape from poverty, they are less likely to
challenge their treatment than American prospects are.
MLB teams know that the absence of agents for Latino baseball talent is
good for them because these players often accept everything offered to them
with no bargaining. The absence of agents allows MLB teams to keep the
costs of finding Latino baseball talent down and to create the freedom to bend
or break MLB rules on signing baseball players. MLB teams generally pay
low signing bonuses to Latino signees, and they often violate MLB rules in
order to get talented players in their systems. This MLB formula is a
paradigm of business efficiency: the production of profit-generating talent at
low cost. Agent involvement would probably raise the level of signing
bonuses and work as a compliance mechanism for MLB rules-each of which
would raise the overall cost of finding Latino baseball talent.
Thus, it is not surprising that MLB teams systematically discourage young
Latino ballplayers from retaining agents. Scouts routinely tell prospects that
175. See Sobel, supra note 106, at 725 (noting agent regulation plan adopted by the MLBPA in
1986).
176. See id. at 724.
177. See id. at 724-25.
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they do not need agents, who are only out for money and not the welfare of the
player. " Once the prospect is signed, MLB teams continue to discourage the
Latino players from working with agents by preventing the players from
receiving communications from agents and continuing to persuade them that
they do not need agent representation. A frequent persuasive tactic is telling
young Latino players that MLB teams might treat them less favorably if they
sign with an agent because such signing suggests the players are rebels or
problematic people.'" When such "persuasion" happens to a child from a
developing country who speaks no English and desperately wants to escape
poverty through baseball, the result is predictable: the player does not sign
with an agent.
With this background, it is easy to see why agents are even more
necessary for foreign players than for Americans. To date, the globalization
of the market for baseball talent has not produced the globalization of the
market for baseball agents. Much of this situation is created by active MLB
deterrence of young Latino athletes from enjoying the benefits that agency
representation brings American draftees. While agents do cause problems, as
evidenced by the public, intercollegiate, and MLBPA regulations on agency
representation in the United States, agents remain necessary to level the
playing field with MLB management. MLB teams' efforts to prevent young
Latino baseball prospects from having agency representation is yet another
manifestation of MLB teams treating Latino players less favorably than
American players.
The intensification of competition for Latino baseball talent, combined
with the attempts by MLB teams, scouts, and baseball academies to keep
agents away from Latino prospects, has led agents to attempt new strategies.
In Latin America, agents are now hiring scouts of their own to find players
before MLB teams do and to bring them under control in connection with
dealing with MLB scouts and teams."8 Latino children with any baseball
talent now confront potential exploitation by the agent-scout dynamic in
addition to the pressures from the MLB team-scout juggernaut.
178. These observations derive from the knowledge and experience gained by Arturo Marcano in his
years of involvement with professional and amateur baseball in Latin America.
179. Id.
180. Id.
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IV. VIOLATION OF INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS AND
LABOR STANDARDS BY MLB TEAMS
The process of scouting Latin American talent, baseball academies, and
the active discouragement of agency representation of Latino baseball
prospects not only constitute three strikes against MLB in its globalized form
but also represent violations by MLB teams of human rights and labor
standards enshrined in international law. 8' Reviewing the behavior of MLB
teams against the human rights and labor standards in international law
demonstrates that the less favorable treatment received by Latino baseball
prospects is a serious matter not to be lightly dismissed. When MLB practices
in Latin American countries are variously described as neocolonial
exploitation, reminiscent of West African slave trading techniques, and almost
like concentration camps, then it is time to hold MLB accountable for its
behavior. The human rights and labor standards violations occur in the area
of the rights of the child because much of the less favorable treatment
discussed earlier in this Article happens to individuals under the age of
eighteen. When MLB teams systematically engage in violations of the human
rights of children and of international labor standards designed to protect
children, something is very wrong in and around the global ballpark.
A. The Relevance ofInternational Human Rights and Labor Standards to the
Globalization of Baseball
Standard legal analyses of baseball do not contain analysis of the
international legal aspects of the global business of baseball as they stick to
strictly national legal issues." To some, analyzing the globalization of
baseball in terms of international human rights and labor standards might seem
wrong because, technically, international law applies to States. While
international organizations are also subjects of international law, such
organizations are merely composed of States. Individuals are also subjects of
international law through human rights concepts, but they generally have
international legal rights in connection with State action. International law
181. Our analysis does not deal with the historic racism, discrimination, and mistreatment
experienced by Latino players in MLB that has been discussed at length elsewhere. See, e.g., REGALADO,
supra note 30. Our analysis focuses on the problems generated by MLB teams hunting for Latino talent.
182. See, e.g., Gary D. Hailey & Douglas R. Pappas, Baseball and the Law, in TOTAL BASEBALL,
supra note 12, at 600; RoGER . ABRAMS, LEGAL BASES: BASEBALL AND THE LAW (1998).
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does not traditionally apply to non-State actors, such as MNCs. As a technical
matter, MLB-as a non-State actor-does not have duties towards individuals
under international law. MLB and MLB teams are subject to the national laws
of the jurisdictions in which they operate. What, then, is the relevance of
arguing that MLB teams violate international legal standards on the human
rights of, and labor protections for, children?
The relevance comes in two forms. First, while many international human
rights and labor standards on children, such as the abolition of child labor,
technically apply only to governments as a matter of international law, these
standards also target non-State actors, such as MNCs. A country that prohibits
child labor to conform to the Minimum Age Convention (MAC) of the
International Labor Organization (ILO)" is adopting an international legal
standard into national law. The law that is then applied to companies is
technically national law, but often the well-spring for the national law is
international law. Thus, measuring the performance of MNCs against human
rights and labor standards cannot be rejected on a legal technicality as the
purpose of the international legal standard is to affect not only State behavior
but also the activities of non-State actors.
Second, as the globalization of markets weakens the formal State, non-
State actors grow in power and influence. Increasingly, human rights
advocates are challenging the behavior of global companies under human
rights standards."' Human Rights Watch noted that "the debate on the
relationship between corporate conduct and human rights evolved from
questioning whether corporations should respect human rights to a recognition
that corporations must implement credible human rights policies and practices
and ensure compliance to these standards."'85  Perhaps the most famous
examples of this involve challenges to American MNCs, such as the Gap and
Nike, using cheap labor in foreign countries that toils under less favorable
183. Convention No. 138 Concerning Minimum Age for Admission to Employment, June 26, 1973,
1015 U.N.T.S. 297 [hereinafter MAC], reprinted in THE RIGHTS OF THE CHIL.D: INTERNATIONAL
INSTRUMENTS 519-27 (Maria Rita Saulle ed., 1995) [hereinafter THE RIGHTS OF THE CHILD].
184. See, e.g., Human Rights Watch, Corporations and Human Rights (visited Feb. 22, 1999)
<ittp://www.hrw.orghrw/worldrepot99/pecial/orporations.htnlm>.
185. Id.
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working conditions than American workers. ' " Another example can be found
in the litigation commenced in the United States against global oil companies
for aiding and abetting human rights violations in Burma.'" Globalization
generally is creating the need to bring non-State actors more directly into
international discourse about human rights and labor standards."=
The globalization of baseball creates similar opportunities to examine the
behavior of MLB and MLB teams in connection with human rights and labor
standards. Baseball is a global business, and MLB seeks to build a growing
global consumer base for its products. Just as Nike and other companies have
been hauled before the court of public opinion for their treatment of foreign
workers, MLB must answer difficult questions that international human rights
and labor standards pose for its less favorable treatment of Latino baseball
talent.
B. Human Rights Analysis of the Globalization of Baseball
1. Definition of the Child
Under the almost universally adopted United Nations Convention on the
Rights of the Child (UNCRC), "a child means every human being below the
age of eighteen years.""I The MAC supports this definition of the child by
stating that "[t]he minimum age for admission to any type of employment or
work which by its nature or the circumstances in which it is carried out is
likely to jeopardize the health, safety or morals of young persons shall not be
186. Id. (noting criticisms of Gap Incorporated and Nike for labor rights violations in overseas
plants).
187. See, e.g., Nat'l Coalition Gov't of the Union of Burma v. UNOCAL, Inc., 176 F.R.D. 329 (C.D.
Cal. 1997) (plaintiffs alleging that UNOCAL, as a joint venturer with the Burmese government on a natural
gas project, is liable for the Burmese government's violations of international law committed in furtherance
of such project); Doe v. UNOCAL Corp., 963 F. Supp. 880 (C.D. Cal. 1997) (class action against UNOCAL
for its complicity with Burmese government's violations of international law).
188. See generally Ariadne Y. Sacharofl Note, Multinationals in Host Countries: Can TheyBe Held
Liable Under the Alien Tort Claims Act for Human Rights Volations?, 23 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 927 (1998).
189. United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child, Nov. 20, 1989, U.N. Doc. A/44/49
(1989) [hereinafter UNCRCJ, art 1, reprinted in THE RIoHTS OF THE CHHLD, supra note 183, at 9, 10.
Article 1 also provides that the jurisdiction in which the child lives may set a lower age at which majority
is attained. Id.
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less than 18 years."'19  Thus, under international law, MLB teams are
significantly engaged with children in their hunt for Latino baseball talent. In
fact, the entire MLB enterprise in Latin American countries is designed to
bring children into MLB and develop them into professional baseball players.
Demarcating at what age a person is a child or an adult is critical to
international human rights standards because the United Nations declared in
1989 that "the child, by reason of his physical and mental immaturity, needs
special safeguards and care, including appropriate legal protection, before as
well as after birth.""9 ' This position has been pronounced repeatedly by
international instruments throughout this century." Under the age of
eighteen, individuals need more not less care and protection. In addition, the
UNCRC proclaims that "children living in exceptionally difficult conditions
... need special consideration.'"9  Children in developing countries who live
in conditions of poverty deserve special protection under international human
rights law.
International labor standards allow the employment of children sixteen
years old "on condition that the health, safety and morals of the young persons
concerned are fully protected and that the young persons concerned are fully
protected and that the young persons have received adequate specific
instruction or vocational training in the relevant branch of activity."'94
Governments may also permit the employment of thirteen- to fifteen-year olds
in "light work which is-(a) not likely to be harmful to their, health and
190. MAC, art. 3.1, reprinted in THE RIGHTS OF THE CHILD, supra note 183, at 520.
191. United Nations General Assembly Declaration on the Rights of the Child, Nov. 20, 1989, pmbl.,
reprinted in THE RIGHTS OF THE CHILD, supra note 183, at 5, 5.
192. The UNCRC states:
The need to extend particular care to the child has been stated in the Geneva
Declaration of the Rights of the Child of 1924 and in the Declaration of the Rights
of the Child adopted by the General Assembly on 20 November 1959, and
recognized in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, in the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (in particular in Articles 23 and 24), in the
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (in particular in
Article 10) and in the statutes and relevant instruments of specialized agencies and
international organizations concerned with the welfare of children ....
UNCRC, pmbl., reprinted in THE RIGHTS OF THE CHILD, supra note 183, at 9-10.
193. Id. at 10.
194. MAC, art 3.3, reprinted in THE RIGHTS OF THE CHILD, supra note 183, at 520-21.
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development; and (b) not such as to prejudice their attendance at school.' 95
In all cases of employment of children under eighteen, international labor law
imposes duties of special care and protection in keeping with the tenor of
international human rights law on children.
It should immediately be apparent from the three strikes against the
globalization of baseball examined earlier that the behavior of MLB and MLB
teams does not conform to the international human rights and labor standard
that children need special safeguards and care. MLB teams go out of their
way to ensure that Latino children do not get special safeguards and care in
the hunt for profit-producing baseball players. MLB teams intentionally use
the economic deprivation that surrounds these children as a weapon in signing
baseball prospects. MLB teams behave as if Latino children are commodities
rather than children in need of special safeguards and care as required by
international law.
2. The Role of Parents
The UNCRC provides that States Parties shall "respect the
responsibilities, rights and duties of parents"'" and "use their best efforts to
ensure recognition of the principle that both parents have common
responsibilities for the upbringing and development of the child."' 1  In
addition, "States Parties shall render appropriate assistance to parents and
legal guardians in the performance of their child-rearing responsibilities and
shall ensure the development of institutions, facilities and services for the care
of children."' Thus, international human rights law places the parents at the
center of the child's development and future.
Based on the analysis in Part m, it is not at all clear that MLB teams
acknowledge the special role of parents in the development of Latino children.
195. Id. art. 7.1, reprinted in THE RIGHTS OF THE CHILD, supra note 183, at 522.
196. UNCRC, art. 5, reprinted in THE RIGHTS OF THE CHILD, supra note 183, at 11.
197. Id. art. 18.1, reprinted in THE RIGHTS OF THE CHILD, supra note 183, at 15. See also id. art. 3.2,
reprinted in THE RIGHTs OF THE CHILD, supra note 183, at 11 ("State Parties undertake to ensure the child
such protection and care as is necessary for his or her well-being, taking into account the rights and duties
of his or her parents .... ).
198. Id. art. 18.2, reprinted in TIE RIGHTs OF THE CHILD, supra note 183, at 15. See also,
International Federation ofSports Medicine/WorldHealth OrganizationAdHoc Committee on Sports and
Children, Sports and Children: Consensus Statement on Organized Sports for Children (visited Mar. 25,
1999) <http://www.who.int/nca/cvd/childsportsJitml> (stressing the importance of parental involvement
in sports training for children).
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Violations of the 17-year old rule and the SPK rule not only do injustice to the
child but also to the parents and the role they play, and are supposed to play,
in the child's upbringing. In addition, MLB teams appear to display little
sensitivity to the strain poverty and lack of education place on Latino parents
that make them vulnerable to the practices of MLB scouts and baseball
academies.
3. The Principle of Non-Discrimination
A central standard in the international law on the rights of children is the
principle of non-discrimination. Under the UNCRC, States Parties are to
respect and ensure the rights enshrined in the Convention "without
discrimination of any kind, irrespective of the child's or his or her parent's or
legal guardian's race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other
opinion, national, ethnic or social origin, property, disability, birth or other
status.""' The principle of non-discrimination is critical to every area of
international human rights law, which indicates the reverence with which this
principle should be approached."'
A key theme of the arguments in Part III of this Article is that MLB teams
treat Latino children less favorably than American children in bringing
baseball prospects into professional baseball. Such less favorable treatment
is a form of discrimination against Latino children. This discrimination is
systematic because it involves: (1) the structural differences between how
American and Latino children are brought into MLB (i.e., draft vs. free
agency), and (2) intentional practices that prevent Latino children from having
access to agents and benefits routinely accorded to American draftees (e.g.,
decent signing bonuses). And, as indicated below, the discrimination also
affects specific children's rights enshrined in international law.
199. UNCRC, art. 2.1, reprinted in THE RIGHTS OF THE CHILD, supra note 183, at 10.
200. See Steven D. Jamar, The International Human Right to Health, 22 S.U. L REV. 1, 25 (1994)
(commenting that the principle of non-discrimination is "so well enshrined in all human rights conventions
as to be an indisputable part of customary international human rights law.").
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4. The Principle of the Best Interests of the Child
Under the UNCRC, a guiding principle is that all actions, whether taken
by the government or private entities, shall be driven by what is in the best
interests of the child.2"' To achieve what is in the best interests of the child,
the UNCRC generally requires States Parties to ensure: (1) necessary child
protection and care, including taking all appropriate measures to achieve such
protection and care, 2 and (2) that institutions, services, and facilities
responsible for the protection and care of children conform with standards set
by competent government authorities.0 3 Many of the other provisions and
rights in the UNCRC also support the principle of the best interests of the
child. The objective of the MAC also relates to the promotion of the best
interests of the child as it seeks to abolish child labor and to raise
progressively the minimum employment age "to a level consistent with the
fullest physical and mental development of young persons. ' 201
The behavior of MLB teams in connection with Latino children raises the
issue whether they act with the best interests of the children in mind. While
MLB offers Latino children career possibilities otherwise unthinkable in their
native countries, the dynamics of the system that MLB teams have created
raise questions whether it operates in the best interests of not only those
Latino children that make it to the major leagues in the United States but also
the vast majority that do not. For example, is it really in the best interests of
a Latino child not to have agency representation in his and his family's
dealings with a MLB team, especially given the language barriers and the
climate created by poverty in Latin American countries? In actively working
against agency representation for Latino baseball prospects, MLB teams are
not, in the words of the UNCRC, undertaking to ensure the child such
protection and care as is necessary for his well-being.
201. See UNCRC, art 3.1, reprinted in THE RIOHTS OF THE CHILD, supra note 183, at 11.
202. Id., art. 3.2, reprinted in THE RIGHTS OF THE CHILD, supra note 183, at 11.
203. Id., art. 3.3, reprinted in THE RIGHTS OF THE CHILD, supra note 183, at 11.
204. MAC, art. 1, reprinted in 1H3 RIGHTS OF THE CHILD, supra note 183, at 519.
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5. Protection Against Economic Exploitation and Physical or
Mental Abuse
The UNCRC provides that children have the right "to be protected from
economic exploitation and from performing any work that is likely to be...
harmful to the child's health or physical, mental, spiritual, moral or social
development." ' 5 In addition, "States Parties shall protect the child against all
other forms of exploitation prejudicial to any aspects of the child's welfare." °1
States Parties are required to take all measures necessary to protect children
from exploitation and abuse.20° The MAC aims for the same protections by
seeking to totally abolish child labor, to secure a minimum employment age
consistent with full physical and mental development, and to protect the
health, safety, and morals of children who are employed .2' The International
Covenant of Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights (CESCR) also declares
that "[c]hildren and young persons should be protected from economic and
social exploitation."2
The fact that MLB teams treat Latino children like commodities raises the
question whether they are engaged in the exploitation of such children for
profit. The discriminatory treatment of Latino children relative to American
prospects in the hunt for baseball talent also suggests that Latino children are
being exploited because they are poor and vulnerable. The violations of the
17-year old and SPK rules further indicate that MLB teams exploit Latino
children. The conditions of the baseball academies point to possible
systematic physical and mental abuse of Latino children.
A technical argument could be raised against these accusations because
the prohibitions against economic exploitation and physical and mental abuse
arise in the context of child labor. It might be argued that children attending
baseball academies are not employed as workers, and thus fall outside the
scope of such protections in international law. The UNCRC provisions on
economic exploitation include requirements to set appropriate hours and
conditions of employment and a minimum age for admission to
205. UNCRC, art 32.1, reprinted in THE RIGHTS OF THE CHILD, supra note 183, at 21.
206. Id. art. 36, reprinted in THE RIGHTS OF THE CHILD, supra note 183, at 22.
207. Id. art. 32.2, reprinted in THE RIGHTS OF THE CHILD, supra note 183, at 21.
208. See MAC, arts. 1, 3.1, 3.3, reprinted in THE RIGHTS OF THE CHILD, supra note 183, at 519-20.
209. International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, 993 U.N.T.S.
3 [hereinafter CESCRI, art 10.3, reprinted in THE RIGHTS OF THE CHILD, supra note 183, at 655, 655.
[Vol. 6:511
THE GLOBALIZATION OF BASEBALL
employment. 10 The MAC does not apply "to work done by children and
young persons in schools for general, vocational or technical education or in
other training institutions."'I" This line of reasoning would argue that the
baseball academies are training institutions and not places of employment for
children. Thus, the international legal prohibitions on economic exploitation
of children do not apply to the activities of baseball academies under
international law.
Such a position would be correct for those Latino children who are not at
the baseball academies under contract. Those children who have signed with
a MLB team are employees who should benefit from the prohibitions against
economic exploitation of children in international law. In connection with
children at the baseball academies who do not have a contract, a technical
defense of economic exploitation is not very impressive and does not address
how MLB teams exploit Latino children in the hunt for profit-producing
players. Subjecting children to physical and mental abuse in baseball
academies cannot be defended under international human rights standards on
technical legal arguments. Systematically treating Latino children less
favorably than American prospects in the search for baseball talent cannot be
defended by MLB seeking legal loopholes.
6 The Right to Education
The UNCRC recognizes that every child has "the right to ... education""'2
and that States Parties are to protect children from economic exploitation that
might "interfere with the child's education."" Similarly, MAC requires that
light work for thirteen- to fifteen-year olds not prejudice their attendance at
school.14 In addition, the MAC requires employment to respect the objective
of the fullest mental development of young persons. 1 More generally, the
210. UNCRC, art. 32.2, reprinted in THE RIGHTS OF THE CHILD, supra note 183, at 21.
211. MAC, art. 6, reprinted in THE RIoHTS OF THE CHILD, supra not 183, at 522.
212. UNCRC, arL 28.1, reprinted in THERIoHTSOFTHE CID, supra note 183, at 19.
213. Id. art. 32.1, reprinted in THE RIoHTS OF THE CHILD, supra note 183, at 2 1.
214. MAC, art. 7.1 (b), reprinted in THE RIGHTS OF THE CHILD, supra note 183, at 522.
215. Id. art. 1, reprinted in THE RIGHTS OF THE CHILD, supra nate 183, at 519.
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right to education is enshrined in many other international legal documents. 16
This emphasis on a child's education in international human rights and labor
law is a critical component of requiring governments and private actors to act
in the best interests of the child.
Baseball academies interfere with the education of the Latino children
who attend them. The schedule and demands of the academies do not allow
children to attend school properly. Children can stay up to three years in the
academies, losing a great deal educationally whether or not they are signed by
a MLB team. MLB teams apparently do little in the academies to foster the
education of the children attending.
One defense to this situation in the Dominican Republic offered by a MLB
scout was that a low percentage of children attend school generally, so the
baseball academy did not interfere with the schooling of the children
attending."7 In addition, one could observe that the preservation of the right
to education is the duty of the parents and the national government, not a MLB
team. If the parents send the child to the baseball academy, then why should
the MLB team worry about the right to education? If the national government
fails to provide adequate educational resources for children, how can MLB
teams be held responsible for violating the right to education? Jose Martinez,
a scout in Latin America for the Atlanta Braves, captured this sentiment when
he said, "I don't know if it's the right thing to say, but I don't think they're
interested in going to school."218
These arguments sound plausible because parents and national
governments in Latin American countries do have responsibilities in
connection with the right to education. Baseball academies operate in Latin
American countries, such as Venezuela, that have enshrined the right to
education in constitutional texts.219 MLB cannot be blamed for the poor
quality of primary and secondary education in Latin American countries that
216. See, e.g, Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Dec. 10, 1948, UN Doc. A/811, art. 26.1,
reprinted in THE RIGHTS OF THE CHILD, supra note 183, at 649, 652; CESCR, art. 13.1, reprinted in THE
RIGHTS OF THE CHILD, supra note 183, at 656.
217. See OLEKSAK & OLEKSAX, supra note 30, at 186 (quoting Ram6n Naranjo, a scout for the
Boston Red Sox and New York Yankees in the Dominican Republic, arguing that "I hear people in the
United States say these kids ought to be in school, but that's ridiculous. Fewer than 20 percent of the kids
in this country go to schooL"').
218. Quoted in Wilkinson, supra note 116, at El.
219. See CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF VENEZUELA, art 78 (on the right to education),
reprinted in CONSTITUTIONS OF THE COUNTRIES OF THE WORLD 13 (A. P. Blaustein and G. H. Flanz eds.,
Supp. 1983).
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fuels the interest of Latino children and their families in the baseball
academies.
But these arguments also neglect the effects of globalization on the power
and duties of non-State actors such as MNCs like MLB. Just as MLB cannot
be held responsible for the failure of the Dominican Republic to provide
adequate primary and secondary education for its children, MLB cannot
escape accountability for operating enterprises in Latin American countries
that do not respect the child's right to education embedded in international
law. The globalization of baseball makes MLB accountable to relevant
international human rights and labor standards in its operations, just as the
activities of MNCs are increasingly scrutinized by human rights advocates.
7. Freedom ofAssociation
The UNCRC recognizes the right of the child to freedom of association.20
The only conditions under which a State Party may restrict the exercise of this
right involve restrictions "necessary in a democratic society in the interests of
national security or public safety, public order (ordre public), the protection
of public health or morals or the protection of the rights and freedoms of
others." '2 The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (CCPR)
also provides for freedom of association, and it emphasizes that such freedom
shall include the right to join trade unions to protect the person's economic
interests.222
MLB teams restrict a Latino child's freedom of association by actively
deterring him from entering into contact with agents. As argued earlier, agents
are perhaps more necessary for Latino prospects than American ones because
of the socioeconomic circumstances often surrounding Latino children.
Latino children are much more vulnerable to pressure from MLB teams to
avoid retaining or even speaking with agents, and MLB teams exploit this
vulnerability in order to get away with breaking MLB rules or to keep costs
of signing Latino talent low. Thus, MLB teams intentionally interfere with
Latino children's freedom to associate with agents to protect their economic
interests. Denying Latino prospects access to agents is equivalent to a
220. UNCRC, art. 15.1, reprinted in THE RIGHTs OF THE CHILD, supra note 183, at 14.
221. Id. art. 15.2, reprinted in THE RIGHTS OF THE CHILD, supra note 183, at 14.
222. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171
[hereinafter CCPR], art. 22.1, reprinted in THE RIGHTS OF THE CHILD, supra note 183, at 659, 665.
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government prohibiting workers from forming and joining trade unions.
Because MLB teams do not engage in such practices with American prospects,
their behavior toward Latino children is discriminatory in connection.with the
right to freedom of association.
C. Summary of Human Rights and Labor Standards Analysis of the
Globalization of Baseball
The specific analyses of international human rights of, and labor
protections for, children negatively affected by MLB's hunt for Latino
baseball talent demonstrate that MLB does not operate in conformity with
international human rights and labor standards on the treatment of children.
The globalization of baseball makes MLB a target for critical human rights
and labor standards analysis just as MNCs face criticism for their human
rights and labor attitudes in their pursuit of global profit. MLB ought to be
held accountable for the behavior of its teams in connection with respect for
the international legal rights of children.
We do not contend that the abuses of MLB constitute the worse abuses of
human rights of, and violations of labor standards for, children in the era of
globalization. Far more sinister abuses and violations occur in the atrocious
working conditions experienced by child labor in many countries and the
sexual exploitation of children around the world.' What happens to Latino
children in baseball academies or when signing with a scout pale in
comparison to what daily happens all over the world to children in many other
contexts. While perspective is important in connection to MLB's treatment
of Latino children, we cannot turn a blind eye on what is happening to Latino
children at the hands of MLB teams because international human rights and
labor standards on the treatment of children exist and should be respected.
Human rights are universal. The Latino child deserves no less respect from
a MLB team than an American child. Taking advantage of the less fortunate
situation of a Latino child for economic reasons is not acceptable morally or
under international human rights and labor standards for children.
223. For examples of such abuses against children, see Amnesty International, Children in South
Asia: Securing Their Rights (visited Feb. 26, 1999) <http://www.amnesty.org/ailib/intcam/childasia/
reporLhtm> (cataloguing human rights abuses against children in South Asia).
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V. REMEDIES FOR THE PROBLEMS CREATED BY
THE GLOBALIZATION OF BASEBALL
The problems identified with the globalization of baseball in this Article
need to be addressed, and many possible remedial strategies can be discussed.
In Part V, we analyze possible remedies in national law, international law, and
within MLB itself. The biggest obstacle to these remedies is their feasibility,
as we believe most are unlikely to be tried or adopted. We think that pressure
will have to brought to bear on MLB to change its practices towards Latino
children, and we examine two possible strategies for bringing such pressure
to bear: (1) national and transnational litigation against MLB and MLB
teams, and (2) labor pressure from Latino baseball players already in MLB.
Of these two strategies, we advocate for Latino and Asian ballplayers to form
a foreign players' association to bring pressure to bear on MLB teams to
improve their treatment of Latino children and of foreign baseball prospects
in general.
A. Responses to Globalization Generally
States have adopted two different legal or regulatory strategies to deal
with the pressures and opportunities created by globalization in international
relations. The first strategy involves national legal reform; and, in many
situations, a process of decentralized harmonization unfolds as different
countries make similar regulatory adjustments to globalization phenomena.2 4
Decentralized harmonization is most apparent in the economic and financial
realms.225  The second strategy is internationalization, under which States
work together on international solutions to global problems."6 As Fidler
observed, "[g]lobalization often begets internationalization because states face
224. See David P. Fidler, The Globalization ofPublic Health: Infectious Diseases and International
Relations, 5 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 11, 16 (1997).
225. Id. ("Primarily through domestic policies, liberal free-market states of Western Europe, North
America, and East Asia have encouraged market and financial interdependence and integration.").
226. DelbrOck, supra note 41, at 11 ("Internationalization... may be defined as a means to enable
nation-states to satisfy the national interest in areas where they are incapable of doing so on their own.").
1999]
GLOBAL LEGAL STUDIES JOURNAL
problems beyond their sovereign control that require international cooperation
to address." ' 7
The decentralized harmonization and internationalization responses to
globalization in international relations do not fit the globalization of baseball
well because these strategies focus on State responses. These two strategies
call for State action, either domestically or internationally. We explore
possible applications of these State-centered strategies to the globalization of
baseball below in Parts V.B and V.C.
MLB is not, however, a State; so we have to move away from strictly
State-centered remedial strategies. Applied to MLB and its global scope,
decentralized harmonization seems an ill-fit because no other professional
league has the presence, power, and talent of MLB. MLB is the "superpower"
of professional baseball in the world, so the globalization of baseball affects
it differently than, for example, winter leagues in Venezuela. Further, MLB
is the engine of the globalization of baseball, making MLB's drive toward
such globalization unlikely to accommodate detours out of sensitivity to the
concerns of other professional leagues.
Internationalization is more relevant because, as evidenced by the
agreements between MLB and the Japanese professional baseball league,
internationalization plays a role in the globalization of baseball as between
professional leagues.228 Internationalization also appears in the various
arrangements made between MLB and the Latin winter leagues.229 The
relevance of internationalization to the globalization of baseball is explored
below in Part V.D.
227. Fidler, The Globalization ofPublic Health, supra note 224, at 17.
228. In January 1999, the commissioners for MLB and the Japanese professional league signed an
agreement under which MLB teams can bid on a Japanese player, if that player's team is willing to make
him available. See Associated Press, Reds Hope to Sign Quezada (last modified Feb. 8, 1999)
<http://espmgo.com/mlb/news/1999/990208/01093.html>. The Japanese team has the option to accept or
reject the offer of the MLB team that wins the auction, and that MLB team gets thirty days to sign the
player. Id. Prior to this agreement, "players under contract with Japanese teams who wanted to move to
the majors had to be released by their club, had their rights sold to a major league team or become eligible
for free agency." Id. For a discussion of an earlier agreement reportedly signed by MLB and the Japanese
professional leagues, see WISE AND MEYER, supra note 131,659-60.
229. For discussion about MLB-Latin winter leagues agreement and problems with it, see supra notes
64-79 and accompanying text.
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B. State-Centered Decentralized Legal Harmonization
One possible remedy for MLB's mistreatment of Latino children is for the
United States, as the home of MLB, and the Latin American countries affected
by MLB practices to adopt national legislation regulating the behavior of
MLB teams. From the perspective of the United States, MLB and MLB teams
are subject to state and federal legislation, and such legislation on MLB
teams' treatment of Latino baseball prospects might be a possible remedy.
Such a strategy has, however, political and legal problems. Politically, it
is very unlikely that the federal legislature or any state legislature will legislate
on this issue. Legally, international legal rules on the application of domestic
law extraterritorially complicate using American statutory responses to
remedy behavior primarily taking place in other countries. Under customary
international law, a State can only apply its domestic law extraterritorially if
it has a recognized basis and if the exercise of such jurisdiction is
reasonable.2 American statutory regulation of the behavior of MLB teams
in foreign countries would have to use either: (1) the nationality principle,"I
or (2) the "effects doctrine" as the basis for the exercise of jurisdiction. 2
Under the nationality principle, the United States can legislate in connection
with the overseas behavior of its citizens and companies. While MLB teams
are clearly subject to U.S. prescriptive jurisdiction under the nationality
principle, many foreign scouts would not fall under the national principle as
they are not American citizens. Nor is it clear that baseball academies can be
regulated by the United States under the nationality principle;23a the United
States has previously run into controversies trying to regulate foreign
214subsidiaries of American companies.
The "effects doctrine" holds that a State may apply its law
extraterritorially if the action sought to be regulated "has or is intended to
230. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 403(1)
(1987) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT].
231. Id. § 402(2).
232. Id. § 402(lXc).
233. See id. § 414(2) ("A state may not ordinarily regulate activities of corporations organized under
the laws of a foreign state on the basis that they are owned or controlled by nationals of the regulating
state.').
234. See id. § 414 reporters' note 3 ("Efforts by the United States to control certain activities of
foreign branches and subsidiaries of United States corporations... have engendered much controversy.").
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have substantial effects within its territory." 5 It is not clear that baseball
academies and the actions of scouts in Latin American countries would qualify
under the effects doctrine as having serious impact on the United States and
its citizens because the adverse effects are experienced outside the United
States by foreign nationals. Even if the effects doctrine could be used as the
basis for the exercise of jurisdiction, whether such extraterritorial regulation
would be reasonable would remain unclear given how ambiguous international
customary law is on this concept.'-' In addition, the extraterritorial application
of American law in various contexts (e.g., antitrust, securities, environment,
and the Helms-Burton Act) has proved very controversial in international
relations, 7 which makes this strategy subject to diplomatic as well as legal
problems.
Clearly, the most reasonable statutory route to pursue exists in those
jurisdictions where MLB teams operate baseball academies and retain scouts.
International legal principles support the exercise of such jurisdiction because
the activities are taking place in the territories of these Latin American
States.23s Territoriality is the strongest basis on which to exercise prescriptive
jurisdiction under customary international law. 39  We noted earlier the
legislation enacted (but not implemented or enforced) in the Dominican
Republic to regulate MLB scouts and baseball academies.2" In addition, many
Latin American countries have existing international legal, constitutional, and
statutory duties to protect the welfare of their children.
The problem with looking to Latin American countries for regulatory
action against MLB teams is not legal but is political, economic, and cultural.
Politically and economically, Latin American countries have more pressing
matters to confront than the globalization of baseball, such as poverty, foreign
debt, disease, corruption, environmental degradation, and in some cases civil
unrest. It is also important to understand how important baseball is to Latin
235. Id. § 402(lXc).
236. See id. § 403(2) (listing factors to consider in determining whether exercise of jurisdiction is
unreasonable).
237. See id. § 402 cmt. d ("Controversy has arisen as a result of economic regulation by the United
States and others,... on the basis of economic effect in their territory, when the conduct was lawful where
carried out").
238. Id. § 402(lXa).
239. Id. § 402 cit. c ("The territorial principle is by far the most common basis for the exercise of
jurisdiction to prescribe, and it has generally been free from controversy.").
240. See supra notes 128-32 and accompanying text.
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American cultures.24 Government plans to tamper with the existing system
might provoke political backlash by those fearful of the government wrecking
the dreams of Latino children to play in the American big leagues by
regulating MLB teams. We believe that people involved witi the Latin winter
leagues feel that rules need to be adopted to regulate the behavior of MLB
teams, but that they hold out no great hope that such rules will come from
their governments.
While these arguments have force, what must be remembered is that MLB
teams are hunting for talent in Latin America for a reason: they need fresh
baseball talent to deliver their product and to make a profit. Latin American
countries have bargaining power in this relationship. Given the proven track
record of Venezuelan players in MLB, a few laws and regulations that simply
level the playing field for Venezuelan players is not in the long run going to
scare off MLB teams. Latin American countries could coordinate their
national legal approaches to MLB behavior. Such legislation might increase
the cost of employing labor in Latin America, but this is not a legal or moral
argument against establishing more equitable treatment of Latino players in
MLB through Latin American legislative and regulatory action.
In the event that Latin American countries decided to pass some laws to
regulate MLB teams, it would be necessary to cover baseball academies,
scouts, and agents. In connection with baseball academies, laws could: (1)
clarify at what age MLB teams can invite children to the academies, and (2)
regulate the schedule of the academies so that they do not interfere with the
educational requirements. At the same time, MLB teams should have to
follow certain minimum requirements related to the attendees' diet, the
condition of the accommodations, the number of hours that the attendees train,
the need for proper medical attention, and the number of prospects they are
allowed to invite each year.
241. See Ruck, supra note 30, at 564. Ruck observed in connection with baseball in the Caribbean
that:
Knitting a common cultural fabric, serving as a vent to social and political tensions,
and offering a vehicle not only for individual mobility but collective social
affirrmation, baseball indeed has been more than a game .... [Baseball] has become
a catalyst to national cohesion and consciousness for the region in its troubled
evolution this century.
Id. See also KLEIN, supra note 116, at 1 ("In the Dominican Republic baseball has a place all out of
proportion to the normal one of sport in society. There is nothing comparable to it in the United States,
nothing as central, as dearly held as baseball is for Dominicans.").
1999]
GLOBAL LEGAL STUDIES JOURNAL
As for regulating scouts, there is the need for a registration process and a
special license for scouts who want to work in the country. Part of the
registration process must include: an orientation course that explains how
scouts have to behave in order to sign a ballplayer; respect for the 17-year old
rule; the need to sign a SPK; the need to get the parents' signature when the
player is under eighteen; the need to pay the signing bonus; and the
requirement that scouts may not discourage prospects from talking to or
retaining agents.
Concerning agents, Latin legislation could draw on American statutory
regulations on sports agents. American statutes on sports agents include many
types of provisions, including registration requirements, fee disclosure and
bonding requirements, accounting requirements for handling a player's
money, and criminal and civil penalties for violations.22
Despite the appeal of legislation from Latin American countries in
connection with the globalization of baseball, we remain skeptical whether
such legislation is ever likely to appear. 3 The globalization of baseball, and
the problems it creates, simply do not register high on the list of priorities
facing developing countries in Latin America already pressed by a myriad of
more serious political and economic problems.
C. State-Centered Internationalization
The use of international human rights and labor law in this Article might
suggest that States could pursue remedies to the problems caused by the
globalization of baseball through internationalization. The practices of MLB
teams in connection with Latino children could, for example, be taken up in
the intergovernmental process established by the UNCRC and the ILO. The
UNCRC created a Committee on the Rights of the Child to oversee the
implementation of the UNCRC that could serve as a forum for discussing the
242. See generally Sobel, supra note 106, at 731-80 (analyzing substantive nature of different agent
regulation statutes and plans in the United States).
243. Klein's observations about the failure of the Dominican Republic to implement and enforce its
laws on MLB scouts and baseball academies also indicate that the mere existence of laws is not sufficient.
See KLEIN, supra note 116, at 54 (noting continued abuses despite laws against such behavior).
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treatment of Latino children by MLB." Similarly, the ILO has procedures for
monitoring compliance with international labor law .1 5  But such
internationalization is unlikely for legal and political reasons. Legally, only
States Parties are subject to the UNCRC and its Committee on the Rights of
the Child and the ILO procedures. This reality means that the failure of a
State Party to protect the rights of children in connection with MLB activities
is the only relevant type of case. In addition, the implementation process does
not include the ability of State or non-State actors to report violations to the
Committee on the Rights of the Child.2" The only information that officially
reaches the Committee on the Rights of the Child comes from the States
Parties in the form of periodic reports. 7 Only if Venezuela, for example,
declared that it had failed to protect the right of Venezuelan children in
connection with MLB activities in Venezuela would the issue formally be
before the Committee on the Rights of the Child. The ILO procedures have
more flexibility in allowing non-State actors to participate in the monitoring
and implementation of international labor law because they involve
representatives from labor unions.2" But whether non-State actors active on
ILO matters would engage the ILO with the issue of MLB treatment of Latino
children is unlikely given the more serious violations of labor standards that
occur worldwide today. Politically, the mistreatment of Latino children by
MLB would not rank high on the list of priorities of States or non-State actors
working to improve the human rights of, and labor standards for, children. Far
more serious violations of children's rights occur that deserve
intergovernmental attention and cooperation. Thus, for these legal and
political reasons, State-centered internationalization would not be a fruitful
way to deal with the problems created by the globalization of baseball.
244. UNCRC, art. 43, reprinted in THE RIGHTS OF THE CHILD, supra note 183, at 25.
245. See Virginia A. Leary, Labor, in 1 UNITED NATIONS LEGAL ORDER 473, 488-92 (Oscar
Schachter & Christopher C. Joyner eds., 1995) (describing ILO methods for inducing compliance with ILO
standards).
246. See UNCRC, art 44, reprinted in THE RIGHTS OF THE CHILD, supra note 183, at 26-27.
247. Id. art. 44.1, reprinted in THE RIGHTS OF THE CHILD, supra note 183, at 26.
248. See Leary, supra note 245, at 489 (noting involvement of workers in the ILO supervisory
institutions).
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D. Remedies from Within MLB
An obvious strategy would be to convince MLB that it has to change the
way its teams hunt for Latino baseball talent. An ambitious approach would
be to turn MLB into a proper global NGO. This strategy would be more
ambitious than the internationalization between professional leagues currently
witnessed in the agreements between MLB and the Japanese league and the
Latin winter leagues. Other international sports, such as soccer, have truly
global organizations. The F~d~ration International de Football Associations
(FIFA) controls and regulates many soccer leagues around the world."9 FIFA
acts as an umbrella organization and coordinates different national soccer
associations.2- As such it is an example of internationalization among non-
State actors to direct the future of a globalized sport. The International
Olympic Committee (lOC) is similarly an international NGO that oversees the
global Olympic movement."' This path would require turning MLB into a
truly global NGO with representatives, officials, and staff from many different
countries. Such a broadening of the scope of MLB would bring the less
favorable treatment of Latino children to the surface as Latin Americans
would have to play an active role in MLB as a global NGO.
Despite superficial appeal to create such a new world order for baseball,
the FIFA and IOC models do not work well applied to MLB. Baseball differs
fundamentally from soccer and the Olympic movement because it is deeply
American-centric. While in soccer many national leagues of high quality
exist, MLB is really the only "big league" in professional baseball. Other
leagues around the world are not only inferior in quality but are also
increasingly becoming talent feeders to MLB.
249. See generally FIFA Web Page (visited Feb. 22, 1999) <hrttp/www.fifa.com>. There is an
International Baseball Association (1BA) located in Lausanne, Switzerland that deals with amateur baseball.
See International Baseball Association Web Page (visited Apr. 8, 1999) <http'J/www.baseball.ch>. The
IBA claims to have "107 National Federation members [and] it organizes the Senior World Cup, World
Championships in their different categories, the Intercontinental Cup and the Baseball Olympic
Tournament, securing the development and expansion of this sport all over the world." Id. For discussion
of IBA's relationship with MLB, see WISE AND MEYER, supra note 131, at 645-46.
250. See Inside FIFA- For the Good of the Game (visited Feb. 22, 1999) <http://www.fifa.com/fifa/
handbook/fgg/fgg3.html> (noting FIFA "is the international federation for the world's most popular sport
... [and] it now has 203 member associations.").
251. See generally IOC Web Page (visited Feb. 22, 1999) <http-//www.olynpic.org>. The IOC
model has, however, been badly tainted by corruption scandals involving IOC members and cities bidding
to host the Olympics. See Nicolaas van Rijn, IOC Moves from Crisis to Crisis, TORONTO STAR, Jan. 31,
1999, available in LEXIS, News Library, Curnws File (reporting on IOC corruption scandal).
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Rather than try to make MLB more like FIFA or the IOC, a more realistic
approach is to change the way MLB operates internally in connection with the
globalization of baseball. MLB has proved adept at accessing foreign markets
for baseball consumers and baseball talent. But what it needs is an
international department or office to deal not only with the global consumer
market (as MLB International does) but also with the human rights and labor
concerns created by the globalization of baseball. MLB could claim that it has
attempted to improve the behavior of MLB teams through the 17-year old rule
and by making sure MLB teams have guidelines to protect teenagers attending
academies. But MLB has not been very vigorous in making sure its rules are
implemented by MLB teams. Nor has MLB been sensitive to the more general
problems Latino players have faced. In response to Felipe Alou's campaign
in the early 1960s to improve the treatment of Latino players in MLB, the
MLB Commissioner appointed a representative in 1965 "to handle Latin
players' affairs and represent them to the commissioner."" But "[b]y the
1970s, the office no longer existed."" 3
The international department should have the mandate of rectifying the
problems MLB teams produce in accessing foreign baseball talent.
Specifically, the international department should draft a set of rules that apply
to the activities of MLB teams overseas, such as rules for baseball academies,
scouts, agents, and the signing of contracts. In addition, the international
department should enforce these rules by allowing foreign players, agents,
coaches, parents, and non-governmental organizations (e.g., foreign baseball
leagues, human rights NGOs) direct access to complain about violations of
MLB's international rules. Such a complaint procedure would necessitate
some type of arbitration or dispute settlement mechanism to arbitrate or
adjudicate alleged violations of the rules. The international department could
also perhaps start formulating the framework for a worldwide draft, which
would bring Latino talent into the same protective system as North American
and Puerto Rican amateurs."
252. REOALADO, supra note 30, at 145.
253. Id.
254. Klein noted in .1991 that a "rumor is circulating that the North American baseball draft will soon
include the Dominican Republic and Venezuela." KLEIN, supra note 116, at 61. He argues that the effects
of instituting the draft in the Dominican Republic would "be to drive up the cost of signing all players" and
"to diminish the power of the academies". Id. It would also change the dynamics of scouting in Latin
America as the draft changed the dynamics of scouting in the United States. See supra notes 92-107 and
accompanying text. Widening the draft to include the rest of Latin America would likely be opposed for
other reasons, including a perceived detriment to the development of baseball talent. Omar Minaya, who
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The biggest problem with this reform idea is its feasibility. Is MLB really
likely to adopt such proposal? At the moment, the idea is hopelessly naive.
MLB teams are all part of a "silent conspiracy" in connection with the
treatment of Latino baseball prospects because they are all involved in these
questionable practices. But MLB is courting trouble if it allows MLB teams
to treat Latino children as they historically have. The reform proposal is
actually in the long-term self-interest of MLB and its teams because the status
quo is a black mark on the product people buy. Other global corporations
have found it in their economic self-interest to make reforms voluntarily in
their foreign labor practices through codes of conduct rather than to continue
to suffer the wounds of bad public relations and consumer anger.' " Many of
the corporate codes of conduct incorporate the human rights and labor
standards found in the UNCRC and the MAC.2"e MLB has an opportunity to
put its global house in order before its unsavory international practices
become more widely known. It will also strengthen the prestige of MLB in
Latin American countries because the reform would demonstrate not only that
MLB likes Latino talent but also that it treats that talent on a par with
American baseball players.
E. Pressure on MLB from the Outside
The internal reforms in MLB discussed above would have a greater
chance of success if outside pressure were placed on MLB. This section
discusses two possible avenues of pressure: (1) national and transnational
litigation against MLB and MLB teams, and (2) collective labor pressure from
foreign players on MLB to improve MLB team practices in foreign markets.
works on developing Latino talent for the New York Mets, has argued that Puerto Rico has been hurt by
being included in the draft: "You used to be able to sign players when they were 16.... Now you have to
wait two years before you can draft them, and they lose two years of important development time with the
team." Quoted in T. R. Sullivan, Rangers Find Talent Shows on Latin Beat, FORT-WORTH STAR
TELEGRAM, Mar. 8, 1998, at 1.
255. See Janelle M. Diller and David A. Levy, Child Labor, Trade and Investment Toward the
Harmonization of International Law, 91 AM. J. INT'L L. 663, 694 rn265 (1997) (noting that a "U.S.
government survey reported that more than 30 of 42 major U.S. retail and manufacturing companies
specifically prohibit child labor, through a corporate code of conduct or other company policy, in the
manufacture of corporate goods by contractors and subcontractors abroad.").
256. Id. at 694.
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1. National and Transnational Litigation
Latino children and their parents could attempt to file claims in the courts
of their own countries or in American state courts to seek redress for the
actions or omissions of MLB teams in Latin American countries that caused
the children and families harm. A hypothetical case could involve a child
physically injured in a baseball academy claiming tort damages against the
relevant MLB team in a national court. The courts of the Latin American
country in question would clearly have subject matter and personal
jurisdiction to hear the claim against the MLB team. The impediments to such
claims are not legal but economic and cultural. It is not realistic to expect
poor families to pursue litigation against well-financed MLB teams. In
addition, litigation as a means of redress is not common in many Latin
American societies as it is commonplace in the United States.
A second litigation strategy would involve claims against MLB teams in
state courts in the United States. Attempts by foreign nationals to seek tort
compensation in American courts have been made in many other contexts, and
these types of claims involve jurisdictional and conflict of laws questions.
While a Texas state court has personal and subject matter jurisdiction over the
Texas Rangers in a tort suit, whether the court would exercise jurisdiction in
a tort claim by a Venezuelan national for a tort allegedly committed in
Venezuela is not necessarily obvious. The Texas court might not be the most
convenient forum to adjudicate the dispute. Even if the Texas court exercised
jurisdiction, choice of law principles might point to the application of
Venezuelan law as the lex loci delicti. While the American practice of
contingency fees might make such suits more economically attractive to poor
Latino families, it is unlikely that American plaintiffs' lawyers are going to be
scouring Latin American for possible tort suits against MLB teams in the
United States.
The analysis of international human rights and labor standards earlier in
this Article raises the question whether transnational human rights litigation
against MLB teams in U.S. federal courts is feasible. American courts are
increasingly used in human rights litigation primarily under the federal Alien
Tort Claims Act, which grants federal district courts original jurisdiction over
"any civil action by an alien for a tort only, committed in violation of the law
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GLOBAL LEGAL STuDIES JOURNAL [Vol. 6:511
of nations or a treaty of the United States." 57 Federal courts have exercised
jurisdiction in cases involving alleged violations of fundamental rules of
customary international law protecting human rights (e.g., in connection with
the prohibition against torture).as A similar strategy pursued against MLB
teams is not likely to be effective for a number of reasons. First, the
legitimacy of using customary international law as the foundation for the
exercise of federal jurisdiction is controversial because differences of opinion
exist as to the status of customary international law in United States federal
law.259 Relying on customary international law on the human rights of
children in litigation before U.S. federal courts would run into the question
whether such courts can legitimately apply customary international law as
federal law absent a treaty or statute. Second, the human rights litigation in
U.S. federal courts has mostly involved allegations against individuals who
acted as agents of a government or under color of government authority."
MLB teams do not act in Latin American countries under the color of any
governmental authority, so the technical application of customary international
law to MLB can be questioned.26" ' Third, much of the human rights litigation
of human rights claims in American courts has not involved allegations of
violations of the human rights of children. Numerous cases dealt with torture
257. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1350 (West 1993).
258. See Filartiga v. Pena-lrala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980). Filartiga spawned a number of cases
using the Alien Tort Claims Act as the basis for federal jurisdiction over individuals alleged to have
committed violations of international human rights norms. See, e.g., Paul v. Avril, 812 F. Supp. 207 (S.D.
Fla. 1993); Forti v. Suarez-Mason, 672 F. Supp. 1531 (N.D. Cal. 1987); In re Estate of Ferdinand Marcos,
25 F.3d 1467 (9th Cir. 1994); Xuncax v. Gramajo, 886 F. Supp 162 (D. Mass. 1995); Kadic v. Karadzic,
70 F.3d 232 (2d Cir. 1995); Hilao v. Marcos, 103 F.3d 767 (9th Cir. 1996); Abebe-Jirav. Negewo, 72 F.3d
844 (1 1th Cir. 1996); Cabiri v. Assasie-Gyimal, 921 F. Supp. 1189 (S.D.N.Y. 1996).
259. See, e.g., Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L Goldsmith, Customary International Law as Federal
Common Law: A Critique ofthe Modern Position, 110 HARV. L REV. 815 (1997) (arguing that customary
international law is not federal law); Harold Hongiu Koh, Is International Law Really State Law?, 111
HARV. L. REV. 1824 (1998) (challenging Bradley's and Goldsmith's arguments); Curtis A. Bradley & Jack
L Goldsmith, Federal Courts and the Incorporation oflnternationalLaw, 111 HARV. L. REv. 2260 (1998)
(responding to Koh's criticisms).
260. See Kadic v. Karadicz, 70 F.3d 232, 245 (2d Cir. 1995) (stating that "[a] private individual acts
under color of law... when he acts together with state officials or with significant state aid.").
261. In Doe v. UNOCAL Corp., the federal district court held that "private actors may be liable for
violations of international law even absent state action." 963 F. Supp. 880, 891 (C.D. Cal. 1997). However,
individual liability under international law absent state action is restricted to a few international crimes,
such as piracy, slave trading genocide, and war crimes. Id. at 891-92. In Kadic v. Karadzic, the federal
appeals court held that "torture and sumnary execution... are proscribed by international law only when
committed by state officials or under color of law." 70 F.3d at 243.
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and inhuman or other degrading treatment. 6  Expanding this line of
transnational human rights litigation into the area of the human rights for
children would be a departure from much of what has already transpired.
While private litigation has proved a powerful motivating factor in the
United States in many contexts (e.g., product liability, environmental
protection, and tobacco control), a litigation strategy against MLB in
connection with the problems created by the globalization of baseball seems,
at the moment, to offer little promise.
2. Labor Pressure on MLB
The history of labor-management relations in MLB suggests that
management does not act on labor-related problems unless actively pressured
by collective labor action to change the status quo." Just as the MLBPA has
gained much for players during the last thirty years,"' a labor association
consisting of Latino and other foreign players could have impact on MLB's
international activities and the dynamics of the globalization of baseball. In
the past, the MLBPA has expressed concern about the treatment of Latino
players, 65 but whether the union has made any progress on the treatment of
Latino children is doubtful given what happens routinely in Latin American
today. The presence of so many Latino ballplayers in MLB means that the
foundation for a powerful foreign players' association exists. Such an
association could play a significant role in leveling the playing field for Latino
children, even in the absence of the legal and other protections American
baseball prospects get. This type of labor association could be the catalyst for
not only changes in the international behavior of MLB teams but also legal
reform in Latin American countries because the Latino superstars carry great
prestige and authority in their home countries.
A foreign players' association could undertake a number of functions to
help remedy the problems created by the globalization of baseball. Such an
association could provide information to baseball prospects in Latin America;
create checklists and guidelines to assist prospects and their parents and
coaches on how MLB teams should behave; develop procedures whereby the
262. See supra note 258 for a list of such cases.
263. On labor-management tensions in MLB, see generally Pietrusza, supra note 12, at 588-99.
264. Id. at 589-99.
265. See Many Latins Discover Baseball is Not a Universal Language, LA. DAILY NEWS, Apr. 26,
1992, at S5.
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association could intervene on a prospect's behalf if a MLB team or an agent
acts in violation of the rules; and make the names and addresses of reputable
agents available to Latino prospects. The association could also put pressure
on the MLBPA to assist it in creating non-discriminatory practices among
MLB teams in the search for baseball talent. Such an association should aim
to set in motion reform within MLB and MLB teams to ensure that Latino
children are treated with respect and are accorded protections and benefits
routinely made available to American baseball prospects.
We believe that pressure from the existing body of foreign players in
MLB is the most effective strategy available to remedy the less favorable and
often exploitative treatment suffered by Latino children that now features in
the globalization of baseball.
CONCLUSION
This Article analyzed the globalization of baseball in order to examine the
problems this phenomenon creates for Latino children. MLB's less favorable
and exploitative treatment of Latino children does not constitute the most
pressing labor problem in the era of the globalization of markets and business.
But people should not ignore such treatment because baseball is just a game.
Professional baseball has always been more than a game; it has always been
a business with a keen eye on efficiency and profit. The myths of America's
pastime should not obscure our ability to see clearly the problems generated
by the globalization of the business of baseball.
The globalization of baseball means that baseball is now a global game.
MLB is trying to build the global ballpark to accommodate the globalizing of
the game. The globalization of baseball is not, however, just about emerging
markets for baseball profits. The globalization of baseball means that MLB
and its teams now have global responsibilities. These global responsibilities
include behaving with respect towards Latino children as required by
international human rights and labor standards. According Latino children
such respect does not mean that socioeconomic differences between Latin
American countries and the United States will disappear, or that Latino
teenagers will get bonuses and salaries identical to American university
graduates. Market forces, influenced by globalization and the economic gap
between the United States and Latin America, will continue to affect the
business of baseball. But MLB's global responsibilities include ensuring that
Latino children are accorded basic protections from economic and social
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exploitation. Unfortunately, we believe that MLB will have to be forced to
live up to these global responsibilities through action by foreign players
already in MLB. Whether such action develops remains uncertain. But only
when MLB has fulfilled these responsibilities will the umpire's call of "Play
Ball!" resonate with global equity and fairness.

